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PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION AND THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE: CONTROLLING TOBACCO IN
THE INTERNET AGE*
WENDY E. PARMET*" & CHRISTOPHER BANTHIN***
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly everything is available through the Internet. Internet users have unprecedented access to education about health care choices' or information on candidates
for political office. 2 Every day, more people use the Internet on a regular basis. The
most recent census reports that as of August 2000 nearly half of all households in
the United States had access to the Internet. 3 Children under the age of eighteen use
the Internet more than any other group, suggesting that the percentage of Internet
users will continue to increase.4 Although it offers myriad benefits for public health,
the Internet also raises new challenges for state public health policies.5 This Article
examines one particularly critical and salient example: the sale of tobacco products
over the Internet and the challenges that such sales pose for state tobacco control and
prevention policies.
The ability of states to regulate and control the sale of tobacco products over the
Internet is absolutely essential to public health. Tobacco remains the leading preventable cause of death in the United States. Cigarette smoking kills 440,000
Americans every year. 6 Tobacco-related deaths exceed the number killed by alcohol,
AIDS, car crashes, "illegal drugs, murders, and suicides combined.' '7 "Smoking-
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1. See Laurence Baker et al., Use of the Internet andE-Mailfor Health CareInformation, 289 JAMA 2400
(2003) (noting significant presence of healthcare information on the Internet and significant access of such
information by patients, but perhaps not as high as original estimates).
2. See Nicholas A. Valentino et al., The Impact ofPoliticalAdvertising on Knowledge, Internet Information
Seeking, and CandidatePreference,54 J. COMM. 337 (2004) (noting significant impact of Internet-based candidate
information on voter awareness).
3. Eric C. Newburger, U.S. Census Bureau, Rep. no. P23-207, Home Computers and Internet Use in the
United States: August 2000 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubslp23-207.pdf (last visited
Aug. 8, 2004).
4.

ComparePEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, DEMOGRAPHICS OF INTERNET USERS, POST ELECTION

2004 & NOV. 2004 TRACKING SURVEYS,

at www.pewintemet.org/trends/Demographicsoflnternetusers-

12.20.04.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005), with AMANDA LENHART ET AL., TEENAGE LIFE ONLINE: THE RISE OF THE
INSTANT-MESSAGE GENERATION AND THE INTERNET'S IMPACT ON FRIENDSHIPS AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 3

(2001), available at www.pewinternet.orgpdfs/PIP Teens-Report.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
5. See, e.g., DAN ROMER, ADOLESCENTRISK COMM. INST., ONA PATH TO PROBLEM GAMBLING: NATIONAL
SURVEY SHOWS CASINOS, SLOTS AND LOTTERIES ATTRACT YOUTH INTO POTENTIALLY ADDICTIVE HABIT (2003)

(noting Internet gambling), available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/07_adolescent-risk/2003_07
_gambling-survey-analysis-rev 10-13_pr.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
6. See A. Hyland et al., Cigarette Smoking Attributable Morbidity---UnitedStates, 2000, 52 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 842 (2003), availableat http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5235.pdf (last visited
Dec. 6, 2004).
7. See CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, TOLL OF TOBACCO IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(2003), available at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0072.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2004).
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health-care medical expenditures" are approximately $75.5
attributable personal
8
billion annually.
Despite the continuing toll exacted by tobacco, public health laws enacted in
recent decades have helped to reduce tobacco consumption and hence tobaccorelated disease and death.9 State efforts have been at the forefront of these interventions.'" These efforts are now challenged by the growing sale of tobacco products,
especially cigarettes, via the Internet."
State efforts to regulate Internet sales of tobacco products face numerous practical
hurdles. Internet retailers are often located beyond a state's borders; indeed, they
may even be offshore. 2 They may also operate under a variety of false names and
through numerous shell corporations, making it difficult to locate responsible
parties. 3 In addition, because of the ease of operation, sellers who come under the
scrutiny4 of regulators can readily create new websites and operate under new
names.'
Although these problems are formidable, they may not prove as serious as the
threat of constitutional challenges to state action. Some of the practical problems can
be at least partially overcome by joint undertakings between states. 5 Others can be
addressed by increasing the resources available for enforcement 6 or by focusing
enforcement efforts on those who deliver the cigarettes into the states. '7 Moreover,
laws need not be fully, or even readily, enforceable to serve a valuable function. As
Jack L. Goldsmith and Alan 0. Sykes remind us,
One does not conclude from the fact that minors obtain and use fake identification to purchase beer, or that thieves sometimes crack safes, or that gray-market
goods are imported into the United States, that drinking laws and criminal laws
and trademark laws are useless ....
Regulation works by
raising the costs of the
8
proscribed activity, not necessarily by eliminating it.

8. See J.L. Fellows, Annual Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of PotentialLife Lost, and Economic
Costs-United States, 1995-1999, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 300, 301 (2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5114.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2004).
9. See Stephen L. Isaacs & Steven A. Schroeder, Where the PublicGood Prevailed:Lessonsfrom Success
Stories in Health, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, June 4, 2001.
10. For a discussion of why the federal government has not led the way, see infra Part H.A.
11. See infra Part I1.C.
12. See JUDITH MACKAY & MICHAEL ERIKSEN, THE TOBACCO ATLAS 60 (Paul Jeremy & Candida Lacey

eds., 2002); see also Kurt M. Ribisl, The Potentialof the Internetas a Medium to Encourage andDiscourageYouth
Tobacco Use, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL i48, i49 (Supp. 12003) (noting that the majority of Internet cigarette vendors
operating from the United States do so from Tribal lands).
13. Cf. MACKAY & ERIKSEN, supra note 12, at 60.
14. See Sharon K. Sandeen, Infor a CalfIs Not Always infor a Cow: An Analysis of the ConstitutionalRight
ofAnonymity as Applied to Anonymous E-Commerce, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527, 536 (2002).
15. For example, the National Association of Attorneys General has had a working group to deal with the
challenges posed by online pharmacies. See Sara E. Zerman, Regulation of Online Pharmacies: A Case for
Cooperative Federalism,10 ANNALS HEALTH L. 105, 123 (2001).
16. This may be a sound economic investment for states that stand to lose significant tax revenues from
Internet tobacco sales. See Christopher Banthin, Cheap Smokes: State and FederalResponses to Tobacco Tax
Evasion over the Internet, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 325 (2004).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 66-95. Because cigarettes are physical objects that cannot be
delivered via the Internet (at least until Star Trek's transporter or replicator is invented), it is easier to regulate
Internet sales of tobacco than Internet sales of pornography, which can be electronically delivered.
18. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J.
785, 812 (2001) (citing Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199, 1223-24, 1229-30
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Therefore, if a state can increase the costs of selling cigarettes to minors on the
Internet, the state may achieve some public health benefit, even though the state will
never be able to stop all such sales. Moreover, regulatory laws also operate by
reinforcing and legitimizing norms by proclaiming public values.' 9 These functions
may be critical in the case of cigarette sales to minors even if the total elimination
of sales is impossible to achieve.2 °
In contrast, constitutional obstacles to state efforts to protect minors from Internet
sales may prove even more onerous. In particular, the judicially developed doctrine
known as the dormant Commerce Clause 21 poses a significant threat to state efforts
to regulate the sale of cigarettes over the Internet. Although courts traditionally
assert that states have the power to protect public health,22 this Article suggests that
the combination of recent doctrinal developments and the increasingly multi-state
and even international nature of public health threats and commerce have made it
more and more difficult for state public health laws to survive challenges brought
under the dormant Commerce Clause. State tobacco control laws that apply to
Internet sales are especially vulnerable to these developments. 23 Only, we will argue,
if states carefully tailor their laws and if courts reinsert public health considerations
into their dormant Commerce Clause analysis will states be able to fulfill their
traditional role of protecting public health in the cyber-age. 24
We begin in Part II with a discussion of the traditional role of the states in
protecting public health. We then discuss the state tobacco control policies that have
been jeopardized by the proliferation of Internet cigarette retailers and how states
have responded. Part III turns to the dormant Commerce Clause, reviewing first, its
development, and second, the contemporary doctrine and its implications for public
health laws. We conclude Part Il with a discussion of the application of the dormant
Commerce Clause to Internet commerce, considering how courts have looked at
dormant Commerce Clause challenges to a wide variety of regulations that apply to
business conducted over the Internet. In Part IV, we return to Internet sales of
tobacco products and consider the fate of state tobacco control regulations that have
been challenged under the Commerce Clause. We will argue that well-devised state
laws should survive a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, but for them to do so
consistently, courts need to be willing to give weight to state public health goals. In
Part V, we offer a brief discussion of the potential role of the federal government
and we respond to the oft-espoused view that the problems we have been discussing
can and should be resolved by federal oversight. We conclude in Part V with an
explanation of why states ought to have a role in protecting public health and why
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine should not be applied in an inflexible

(1998); Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace,48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (1996)).
19. Much has been written about the so-called expressive power of law. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law,
Economics & Norms: On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996).
20. Indeed, public health laws frequently operate by setting norms and influencing behavior. This normsetting function has been particularly important to tobacco control laws. See id. at 2035 (discussing how tobacco
control laws work by changing social norms regarding smoking).
21. For a fuller discussion of the doctrine, see infra Part III.A.
22. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 366 (1992).
23. See infra Part V.B.
24. See infra Parts IV.B, V.B.
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manner that precludes the possibility of state public health protection in the Internet
Age.
HI. STATE TOBACCO CONTROL LAWS AND THE INTERNET
A. The TraditionalRole of the States in Protecting PublicHealth
In considering the constitutional limitations that states face when they attempt to
regulate the sale of tobacco over the Internet, it is helpful to recall that public health
protection has traditionally been understood to be primarily within the province of
the states.25 Throughout the nineteenth century, the federal government played a
relatively small, though hardly trivial, role in protecting public health.26 States, in
contrast, played a far more robust role, enacting sanitary codes, enforcing quarantines, licensing practitioners, and regulating the sale of potentially dangerous
products. Throughout that century, courts stressed that protection of public health
lays within the so-called police powers of the state-the sovereign powers of the
states to regulate their domestic affairs.28
In the courts, the close constitutional association between the police power and
public health dates back as far as 1824 when, in Gibbons v. Ogden,29 Chief Justice
Marshall cited "[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, [and] health laws of every
description" as part of the "mass of legislation" that would become known as the
police powers.30 Three years later, in Brown v. Maryland,3' the Chief Justice again
observed, "The removal or destruction of infectious or unsound articles is,
undoubtedly, an exercise of that power.... 32
Throughout the nineteenth century, the states' police power played a prominent
role in constitutional law. Although the term "police power" seemed to defy a clear
25. James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modem PublicHealth Goals Through Government: An Examination

of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L & POL'Y 93, 94 (1997).
26. See wendy E. Parmet, After September11: Rethinking Public HealthFederalism,30 J.L MED. & ETHIcs
201, 203-04 (2002) [hereinafter Parmet, After September 11].
27. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1888); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THEPEOPLE'SWELFARE:
LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 191-233 (1996); Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughter-

House to Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the Constitutionalizationof Public Health, 40 AMER. J. LEGAL HIST. 476,
489-92 (1996) [hereinafter Parmet, Slaughter-House] (discussing public health laws in the mid-to-late nineteenth
century).
28. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824); Parmet, After September11, supra note 26,
at 202-03. Some scholars also note that states can use their parens patriae power to protect the health of minors and
incompetent individuals. See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAw: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 51-55
(2000). Using this classification, state laws aimed at preventing sales of cigarettes to minors might be viewed as
an exercise of the patens patriae power rather than the police power. However, while the distinction is useful
analytically, because the state's justification for regulation may differ in the case of the police power (limiting the
action of an individual or entity for the good of the public) from that used in the case of the patens patriae power
(limiting an individual's action for his or her own good), as a constitutional matter the distinction is not particularly
relevant. Indeed, in Gibbons, Justice Marshall suggested a broad definition of the police power, one that would
encompass all of the state's powers to protect the public health. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203. The Justice saw the
police power as consisting of "that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of
a State, not surrendered to the general government." Id.
29. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
30. Id. at 19. Earlier connections between the police power and health appeared in congressional debates
over quarantine. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1353 (1796) (remarks of Rep. Gallatin).
31. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
32. Id. at 444.
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definition, 3 it remained firmly associated with public health.34 In cases arising under
both the dormant Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court often treated the question of whether a state regulation was actually a public
health regulation as critical to the determination of whether the state acted within its
police power and hence constitutionally. For example, in Wilson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 35 Chief Justice Marshall upheld a state law authorizing the erection of
a dam on a stream used for interstate commerce by noting that the dam would
enhance the value of the property on the banks "and the health of the inhabitants
probably [would be] improved. 36 This objective, Justice Marshall noted, was
"undoubtedly within those [powers] which are reserved to the States. '37 Years later,
in the Slaughter-House Cases,38 the Supreme Court's first decision under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court affirmed a state law creating a slaughter-house
monopoly in large part because the Court saw the state law as a traditional public
health regulation designed to protect the public from the unwholesome slaughtering
industry.39 Likewise, in Morgan'sSteamship Co. v. LouisianaBoardofHealth,4 the
Court upheld an inspection fee imposed on vessels arriving at the port of New
Orleans because the police power of the state permitted the state to take measures
to protect the city from the importation of cholera and yellow fever. 4t On the other
hand, in the infamous Lochner v. New York,42 the Court struck down New York's
maximum hours law for bakeshops in large measure because the Court found that
the law was not "necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public
43
health or the health of the individuals who are following the trade of a baker.
The fact that courts at that time upheld those state laws that they viewed as public
health laws as within the police power should not be surprising. During the
nineteenth century, growing American cities were repeatedly ravaged by horrific

33. The Supreme Court has noted that the police power defies simple definition. See The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1873). At times the police power has been treated as if it consists of several
specific, discrete powers, including the protection of public health and morals. E.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S.
27, 31 (1885) (defining the police power as the power "to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,
education, and good order of the people"). Some theorists have associated it with the common law maxim sic utere
tuo ut arenum non laedas, which permits the limitation of an individual's right to prevent harm to another, while
others associate it with the broader maxim salus populi suprema lex, which translates as the health or good of the
populous is the highest good. Compare NOVAK, supra note 27 (arguing that there was extensive police power
regulation in the nineteenth century reflecting a broad understanding of the police power and salus populi), with
Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power: Some Observationsfor a New Century, 27
HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 511 (2000) (arguing that the construction of the police power evolved from a narrow one
based on the common law maxim sic utere to a broader one reflecting salus populi). Justice Marshall, however,
seemed to provide a simpler definition. He described the police power as the power that the states had not delegated
in the Constitution to the federal government. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203; supra note 28.
34. See Parmet, Slaughter-House, supra note 27, at 478-80.
35. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
36. Id. at 251.
37. Id.
38. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
39. Id. at 62-63. For a fuller discussion of the public health aspects of Slaughter-House, see Parmet,
Slaughter-House, supra note 27, at 481-88.
40. 118 U.S. 455 (1886).
41. Id. at 466-67.
42. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
43. Id. at 58. For a further discussion of the public health issues at stake in Lochner, see Parmet, SlaughterHouse, supra note 27, at 497-501.

[Vol. 35

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

epidemics. For example, at least 2,000 New Yorkers were killed by cholera in 1832
and over 5,000 were killed in the cholera epidemic of 1849. 44 Even more startling,
45
in 1853 alone, yellow fever killed one-tenth of the population of New Orleans. In
response to these terrifying epidemics, a public health movement developed, and
state and local governments began to establish standing boards of public health and
use their police powers to institute new sanitary measures. 46 Fortunately, these
undertakings proved quite effective. As a result, when cholera returned to New York
in the 1860s for essentially the last time, the city was well prepared and the epidemic
proved far less deadly than previous ones. 47 It was in this atmosphere that Americans
extolled the "gospel of public health, 48 and courts upheld state public health laws
by noting that "salus populi suprema lex"--the safety of the people is the supreme
law.49
Despite the strong historical association between the states' police power and
public health laws, three caveats must be considered before we turn to an analysis
of the constitutionality of state laws aimed at Internet tobacco sales. First, the
recognition that public health protection lay within the core of the states' police
powers has never precluded federal public health regulation. Although the federal
government does not have public health powers per se, it has almost always been
able to use its constitutionally enumerated powers, especially its power to tax and
spend, to achieve public health goals. 50 As a result, the fact that public health
protection is within the states' police power does not prevent the federal government
from preempting state public health laws under the Supremacy Clause. 5
Second, although the courts, especially in the nineteenth century, were generally
quite deferential to state police power laws, such laws have always been subject to
specific constitutional limitations. For example, even in the 1880s, during the golden
age of public health, the Supreme Court of the United States struck down a city's
use of its police powers when those powers were used in a racially discriminatory
manner.5 2 In the twentieth century, the judiciary became even more willing to limit
the states' exercise of the police power in the name of individual rights or equal
protection. 53 Today, in particular, stringent protection for individual First Amend-

44. JOHN DUFFY, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW YORK CITY 1625-1866, at 442, 444 (1968).
LABBE & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE
45. RONALD M.
RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 26 (2003).

CASES:

REGULATION,

46. Parmet, Slaughter-House, supra note 27, at 489.
47. CHARLES ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA YEARS 209 (1962) (noting that although the city's population had
grown significantly between 1849 and 1866, only one-tenth as many people died in the latter epidemic as in the
former).
48. Id. at 213-25.
49. Haverty v. Bass, 66 Me. 71, 74 (1874).
50. Parmet, After September 11, supra note 26, at 203-04. In recent years, the Supreme Court's New
Federalism cases have cast some doubt upon this assertion. See id. at 204-06. However, no case to date questions
the ability of the federal government to use its power to tax and spend or to regulate commercial activity to seek
to improve public health.
51. For a further discussion of federal preemption, see infra text accompanying notes 161-162.
52. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
53. See wendy E. Parmet, Legal Rights and CommunicableDisease:AIDS, the Police Power,and Individual
Liberty, 14 J.HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 741, 757-62.
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ment rights poses a particularly significant challenge to state public health laws,
including laws that seek to protect minors from tobacco use. 4
Finally, the claim that the states have the power to protect public health inevitably
evades the sixty-four million dollar question: what is a public health law? During
an era in which infectious diseases were rampant, it was relatively easy for courts
to recognize that quarantine laws, 5 vaccination laws,56 and even sanitary laws 57 were
in fact public health laws within the states' police power. Laws that less obviously
responded to the threat of epidemics presented a greater challenge. 8 Indeed, as
infectious diseases waned in prominence and new public health problems, such as
occupational injuries or tobacco use, became pressing public health issues, it was
understandably more difficult for courts to "know public health when they saw it."59
Perhaps that helps to explain why, after the New Deal, the Supreme Court seemed
anxious to cease attempting to decide just what was and what was not public health
or within the police power. Hence, in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,6' faced with
a state law that purported to be aimed at protecting the visual health of the state's
residents, the Supreme Court threw up its hands and declared that when faced with
a due process or equal protection challenge, it would simply ask whether the state's
law was "rational.,, 6 ' Likewise, in a case challenging a state law that purported to be
enacted to protect highway safety, Justice Brennan noted that "[i]t is not the function
of the court to decide whether in fact the regulation promotes its intended purpose,
so long as an examination of the evidence before or available to the lawmaker
indicates that the regulation is not wholly irrational in light of its purposes."62 In
both instances, the Justices' uncertainty about whether the state law at issue truly
was a public health law led them to counsel for deference to the states. But once a
court feels uncertain as to whether a putative public health law really is a public
health law, the court may well be tempted to give less weight to claims that a state
law is aimed at protecting public health. This wariness is increasingly evident in

54. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 562-64 (2001).
55. E.g., Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902)
(upholding state law prohibiting immigrants from entering areas of the state where there was disease on the theory
that even healthy immigrants would spread disease); Staples v. Plymouth Co., 62 Iowa 364 (1883) (upholding
quarantine law as quarantine is "demanded by humanity" and long has been known to stop the spread of
contagions).
56. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding law requiring smallpox vaccination).
57. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (upholding state law that limited the places in which
slaughtering could occur).
58. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down maximum hours law); Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (upholding regulation of oleomargarine).
59. This is taken from Justice Stewart's famous line about pornography. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
Indeed, scholars and public health
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("But I know it when I see it....").
theorists have also debated the meaning and scope of public health in an era in which so-called lifestyle diseases
are the greatest killers. See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRANT § 3.14 (2000);
Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSP. INBIOLOGY & MED. S199 (Supp. 2003);
Richard Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last,A Defense of the "Old" PublicHealth, 46 PERSP. INBIOLOGY
& MED. S138 (Supp. 2003).
60. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
61. Id. at 491. Of course, the Supreme Court quickly came to apply a more rigorous standard of review for
certain categories of cases, especially those that raised claims of discrimination, a violation of the Bill of Rights,
or of so-called fundamental rights. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
62. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 680-81 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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dormant Commerce Clause cases and may have a profound impact on the states'
ability to protect minors from Internet tobacco sales.
B. State Tobacco ControlLaws
Whereas infectious diseases were the great public health menaces of the nineteenth century, tobacco is the number one preventable killer today. 63 Not surprisingly, in our time, states have used their police power to regulate tobacco and reduce
tobacco consumption. 64
State action in this area is especially critical in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,65 where the Court considered regulations promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) aimed
primarily at protecting minors.66 The regulations prohibited retailers from selling
cigarettes in packages containing fewer than twenty cigarettes, banned the distribution of free samples, limited the advertising and promotion of tobacco products,
prohibited the sale and distribution of brand-identified promotional non-tobacco
items, required ingredient disclosures, regulated the levels of nicotine and toxic
ingredients of tobacco products, and more. 67 Leading cigarette manufacturers
immediately challenged the regulations, and, four years later, the Court concluded
that the FDA lacked the jurisdiction necessary to regulate tobacco products.68
The Supreme Court's decision effectively left the protection of minors to either
the states or Congress. Although Congress undoubtedly has the authority to enact
legislation to protect children from Internet sales of tobacco,69 it has thus far
refrained from action. 70 As a result, state tobacco control laws remain the linchpin
to legal efforts to protect minors from tobacco.
Two well-established state tobacco control policies are especially relevant for our
discussion of Internet sales. The first of these policies is the use of tobacco taxes to
dissuade smoking.7 ' Tobacco taxes were originally levied solely as a means to raise

63. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HEALTH Topics: TOBACCO HEALTH YOUTH,
at www.cdc.gov.
64. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SMOKING AND TOBACCO CONTROL MONOGRAPH No. 11, STATE AND LOCAL LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO REDUCE TOBACCO USE § 2,65-184 (NIH Pub. No. 004804, 2000), available at http://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/tcrb/monographs/l1 (last visited Jan. 16, 2005).
65. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
66. Id. at 125. As the Supreme Court noted, most tobacco users begin their habit before they are eighteen
years of age. Id.
67. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (Aug. 11, 1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 897).
68. The Court's conclusion ironically stemmed from the acknowledgement that tobacco products are harmful
to the public's health when used as intended. The FDA's approval of drugs and foods requires a showing that such
articles are safe for their intended use. See 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2000). Because tobacco products cause disease and
death when used as intended, the Court determined that the FDA would ultimately be required to remove tobacco
products from the market based on the FDA's enabling legislation. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. at 134-37. According to the Court, this unavoidable course of action contradicted tobacco-related federal
statutes implying that Congress intended that cigarettes remain a part of commerce. See id. at 137-43.
69. Congress does not have any public health authority per se. But Congress does have the authority to regulate interstate commerce, and there can be little doubt that such sales fall within that realm. U.S. CONST. art. L § 8.
70. For a discussion of pending congressional legislation and why state action would remain important even
if it were enacted, see infra Part V.
71. See DAVID SATCHER, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT
OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 322-60 (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_2000IFullReport.pdf

(last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
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revenue,7 2 but when the first reports describing the adverse health effects of
cigarettes were issued in the mid-1950s, and particularly upon the release of the first
Surgeon General's report on smoking and health in 1964, states actively used
tobacco taxes to dissuade smoking.7 3 Despite the addictive properties of nicotine,
there is an inverse relationship between smoking rates and cigarette prices. 74 As the
price of cigarettes rises, the quantity of cigarettes demanded falls.75 Tobacco taxes
afford states an effective means for increasing cigarette prices, thereby reducing
smoking rates.76
Since the beginning of 2003, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have
raised their cigarette taxes,77 making the average state tax $0.84 per pack.78 Seventeen states and the District of Columbia now have a cigarette tax of $1.00 or higher
per pack.79 Cigarette taxes reach as high as $3.00 per pack in New York City. ° State
tobacco taxes have begun to force smokers to internalize the true cost of smoking,
which the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate to be $7.18 per
pack."
The other well-established state tobacco control strategy undermined by Internet
cigarette retailers is restricting youth access to tobacco products.8 2 Youth-access
policies, which states began to adopt during the early 1990s,3 actually include a
broad array of mandated protocols for the retail distribution of tobacco products.8
For example, the licensing of tobacco retailers is commonly used as part of a state

72.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 64.

73. See SATCHER, supra note 71, at 338-39; Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Annual SmokingAttributable Mortality, Years of PotentialLife Lost, and Economic Costs-UnitedStates, 1995-1999, 12 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 300-03 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm 114.pdf (last
visited Jan. 4, 2005). In effect, states are using their power to tax to achieve police power ends. Such use of taxation
as a form of regulation has been long recognized. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 427 (1819).
74. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 322. The presence of an inverse relationship between smoking and the price of
cigarettes does not support the argument that the continuation of smoking is a matter of free choice. An inverse relationship between consumption and price exists for addictive substances. Nicotine causes an addiction similar to and
as powerful as that of cocaine or heroin. C. EVERETr KOOP, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5, 241-374 (1988).

75. See SATCHER, supra note 71, at 322.
76. Id.
77.

See KATIE MCMAHON, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, STATE CIGARETTE TAXES & PROJECTED

BENEFITS FROM INCREASING THEM (2004), at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0148.pdf (last
visited Feb. 13, 2005).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, RAISING CIGARETTE TAXES ALWAYS INCREASES STATES

REVENUES (AND ALWAYS REDUCES SMOKING) (2003), available at http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/
pdf/0098.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
81. The health-related cost and productivity loss associated with cigarette use amounts to $7.18 per pack
of cigarettes. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supranote 73.
82. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 64.
83. In 1992, states began to adopt youth access measures and, in some cases, encouraged their county and
municipal governments to do the same when Congress amended the Public Health Services Act to require all states
to enforce laws prohibiting the sale and distribution of tobacco products to minors as a condition for receiving
mental health block grants from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. See Synar Amendments 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-321, 106 Stat. 394, Title II, § 202, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26.
84. Richard A. Daynard et al., Tobacco Prevention and Control, in RICHARD A. GOODMAN ET AL., LAW IN
PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 323, 330-31 (2003) (reviewing elements of model youth-access laws); see also U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 64 (surveying state and local youth-access laws and stating that
the guidelines often include a mix of state laws and municipal or county measures).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

youth-access policy. 85 Licensure allows law enforcement officials to stop retailers
from selling cigarettes altogether or to impose less burdensome monetary fines after
retailers have sold to minors. 86 Other youth-access measures require store clerks to
check IDs, ban self-service displays, ban or restrict the placement of vending
machines, ban the sale of single cigarettes or packages containing less then twenty
cigarettes, and ban the distribution of free cigarettes.87
Both of these tobacco control policies serve to keep young people from smoking,
a critical goal because the vast majority of smokers become addicted before they
reach the age of eighteen. 88 States and local communities established youth-access
policies in direct response to smoking among children with the intent of reducing
their supply of tobacco products. 89 Additionally, tobacco taxes are particularly
effective at reducing youth demand for tobacco products. 9° On average, for every ten
percent increase in the cost of a pack of cigarettes, overall smoking rates will
decrease three to five percent, and by seven percent for smokers who are less than
eighteen years of age. 9' Hence, in enacting these laws, states are following a wellestablished tradition: using their police power in order to reduce the health risks
faced by their residents.
C. The Problems Associated with Internet CigaretteRetailers
The sale of cigarettes over the Internet undermines these traditional state tobacco
control policies and, thus, raises concerns about smoking rates, particularly among
minors. With regard to tobacco taxation, Internet cigarette retailers usually fail to
collect the state sales and tobacco taxes that customers are otherwise required to pay
when purchasing cigarettes from a vending machine, convenience store, or other
traditional vendor.92 The sale of untaxed and partially taxed cigarettes over the
Internet, if unchecked, could start to counteract the typical effects of tobacco tax
increases. As more and more people go online, the offer of tax-free tobacco products
would tend to attract more consumers, some who are looking for ways to avoid
tobacco tax increases and others who will give in to the temptation to experiment
with tobacco products because the price is right.

85.

See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 64, § 2, 137-63.

86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Eighty-two percent of adult smokers begin smoking before they have reached eighteen, the age at which
they may legafly purchase cigarettes. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Youth Surveillance-United
States 2000, 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (2000).
89. The effectiveness of youth access policies is the subject of ongoing debate within the tobacco control
community. See P.M. Ung et al., Is It Time to Abandon Youth Access Tobacco Programmes,11 TOBACCO CONTROL
3-6 (2002). The debate has not included the effectiveness of youth-access policies as they relate to Internet cigarette
vendors.
90. FRANK J. CHALOPKA & ROSALIE LICCARDO PACULA, AN EXAMINATION OF GENDER AND RACE
DIFFERENCES IN YOUTH SMOKING RESPONSIVENESS TO PRICE AND TOBACCO CONTROL POLICIES (National Bureau

of Economic Research, working paper April 1998).
91. See ERIC LUNDBLOM, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS, RAISING CIGARETTE TAXES REDUCES
SMOKING, ESPECIALLY AMONG KIDS, availableat httpJ/www.tobaccofreekids.org/resesarch/factsheets/pdf/0146.pdf

(last visited Jan. 13, 2005).
92. Ribisl, supra note 12.
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So far, only a relatively small number of consumers buy tobacco products online,93 and, thus, tobacco tax increases remain an effective means for reducing
smoking rates and generating revenue for states.' However, research to this effect
has not stopped the tobacco industry from arguing that tobacco tax increases are
now useless." Indeed, exaggerating the impact of Internet cigarette retailers on the
efficacy of tobacco taxes could very well constitute the most significant current
threat to the strategic use of tobacco taxation.
The tobacco industry has opposed tobacco tax increases for years by exaggerating
the impact of smuggling in untaxed tobacco products. 96 In perhaps the most famous
example of this argument, the tobacco industry successfully rolled back Canadian
tobacco taxes in the early 1990s.97 The Canadian provinces started raising cigarette
taxes throughout the 1980s and early 1990s to combat some of the highest smoking
rates in the world.98 The tax increases achieved the desired result by lowering
smoking rates drastically. 99 Not pleased by this development," ° the tobacco industry
responded with a marketing and lobbying campaign designed to reduce tobacco
taxes as a means for ending smuggling, which had also increased during this
period.'0 1 In early 1994, the federal government and several provincial governments
the campaign and cut taxes.10 2 Real cigarette prices were cut in half in
bought into 03
1
most areas.
The tax cuts slowed quit rates among adults and increased initiation rates among
new smokers."° Billions of dollars in tobacco tax revenues were lost.105 In just one
year, the difference in smoking rates between the provinces that cut tobacco taxes
compared with those that did not increased from two percent to 3.4%." ° By 1998,
per capita cigarette consumption in the high-tax provinces dropped by twenty-four
93. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE NHSDA REPORT: How YOUTHS GET CIGARETTES

(2002). (stating that 3.3% of youth who purchased cigarettes for themselves did so through the Internet), at
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k2/YouthCigs/YouthCigs.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
94. S. Emery et al., Was There Significant Tax Evasion after the 1999 50 Cent Per Pack Cigarette Tax
Increase in California?, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL 130 (2002) (noting a tobacco tax increase in California did not
cause many consumers to purchase cigarettes from Internet cigarette retailers as of the end of 1999); see also
MATTHEW C.FARRELLY ETAL., RTIINT'L, STATE CIGARETTE EXCISE TAXES: IMPLICATIONS FOR REVENUE AND TAX

EVASION (2003), at http://www.rti.org/pubs/8742_ExciseTaxesFR.5-03.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2005) (finding
continued revenue increases and decreases in smoking rates based on state tobacco tax increases as of May 2003,
but also recognizing potential threat of Internet cigarette retailers on such benefits).
95. See Michelle Leverett et al., Tobacco Use: The Impact of Prices,30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Special Supp.,
Fall 2002, at 88, 89; see also Hope Yen, Ex-Surgeons General Seek New Cigarette Tax, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 4,
2004 (noting an example of such an argument). This argument can be found on R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's
website, at http://www.rjrt.com/TITI TaxesPayments.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2005).
96. Kenneth E. warner, The Economics ofTobacco: Myths and Realities, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 78 (2000).
97. See CANADIAN CANCER SOC'Y, SURVEYINGTHE DAMAGE: CUT-RATE TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND PUBLIC
HEALTH INTHE 1990S 24-26 (1999), available at http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/DOCUMENTS/PDFs/oct99taxrep.pdf
(last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 24.
100. Id. at 25.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Vivian H. Hamilton et al., The Effect of Tobacco Tax Cuts on Cigarette Smoking in Canada, 156
CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 187, 190 (1997).
105. See CANADIAN CANCER SOC'Y, supra note 97, at 44.
106. See Hamilton et al., supra note 104, at 187, 189.
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percent starting in 1990, compared with a drop of only eight percent in low-tax
provinces over the same period. 17 In 1999, after tracking the impact of the tax cuts,
the Canadian Cancer Society and other public health organizations concluded that
the adverse effect of the tax cuts far exceeded any detrimental effects to smoking
rates caused by smuggling."18 The proliferation of Internet cigarette retailers affords
the tobacco industry the chance to rehash the argument that it found to be so
successful in Canada.
In addition to undermining the strategic use of tobacco taxes, Internet cigarette
retailers routinely ignore minimum age sales laws and state youth-access policies.
As discussed above, states commonly employ numerous laws to reduce cigarette
sales to minors." Internet sellers commonly fail to comply with these laws and
undertake little or no effort to ensure that their sales are to adults. For example, Kurt
Ribisl and colleagues revealed in 2002 that nearly all of the websites selling
cigarettes lack effective age verification protocols. "0 The most common protocols
simply asked the customer's age by having the customer click on a box indicating
that he or she is at least eighteen or by typing in a birth date."' In contrast, only nine
percent of the web sites surveyed required customers to provide a driver's license
number, which can be compared against state motor vehicle records or other databases.'12 Only six percent indicated that photographic identification would be needed
upon delivery." 3 Ribisl and colleagues found no web sites registered with parent
controlled filtering or blocking software." 4
Contrary to common belief, payment requirements established by Internet
cigarette retailers also fail to create significant hurdles for minors. The largest credit
card company recently warned online retailers who use its services that issuance of
a Visa card cannot be taken as proof that the customer is over eighteen years of
age. "' Children under the age of eighteen years can acquire credit cards if a parent
co-signs." 6 Moreover, minors can purchase goods over the Internet by using
payment services such as "paypal.com," which allows users to deposit funds into an
online account and then transfer funds to pay for online purchases."i7 A search of the
online retailers using paypal.com revealed numerous Internet cigarette retailers." 8
Indeed, numerous compliance checks conducted from 1999 to the present reveal
that most Internet cigarette retailers will sell to children." 9 A 2003 study by Ribisl

107. See CANADIAN CANCER SOC'Y, supra note 97, at 43.
108. See id. at 1.
109. See supraPart H.B.
110. Kurt Ribisl et al., Are the Sales Practicesof Internet Cigarette Vendors Good Enough to PreventSales
to Minors?, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 940 (2002).
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115.

See VISA, ACCEPTING VISA: MERCHANT RESPONSIBILITY,

at http://www.usa.visa.com/business/

accepting-visa/index.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
116. See id.
117. See http://www.paypal.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., Lori Enos, Shakeout Can't Put Out Web Tobacco Sales, E-COMMERCE TIMES, Feb. 23, 2001,
at http://www.ecoimercetimes.com/perl/story/7625.html (noting that attorneys general in Michigan, Texas,
Maryland, and other states have sued Internet tobacco retailers for failing to verify purchasers' ages); see also
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and colleagues published in The Journal of the American Medical Association
showed that minors purchasing cigarettes from Internet cigarette vendors are
successful eighty-nine percent of the time when using money orders and ninety-four
percent of the time when using credit cards. 2 ° The researchers recruited four
adolescents to test Internet cigarette retailers' compliance with state minimum age
sales laws, which make it illegal to sell cigarettes to people under the age of
eighteen. The youth operatives used reloadable Visa credit cards and money orders
they obtained at a local store.
The youth recruited for the study encountered either no age verification protocols
or ineffective age verification protocols.' 2 ' Almost all of the packages ordered as
part of the study were simply left at the front doors of the purchasers.'22 Only one
23
percent of the packages clearly indicated they contained tobacco products.,
Additionally, some retailers sent complimentary items, including pens, ashtrays, and
lighters displaying the vendors' logos. 24 One retailer sent six free cartons of
cigarettes several weeks after the original purchase with no explanation or request
for payment.'25
The number of Internet cigarette retailers is increasing dramatically. 26 Already,
Internet cigarette vendors are easily located through most Internet search engines,
even when parental control software is running on the user's computer.' 27 In the
years to come, if Internet cigarette retailers' practices remain unchanged, more
minors may purchase cigarettes via the Internet. Not surprisingly, states are beginning to devise regulatory responses.
D. The Regulatory Responses by States
In recent years, many states have instituted policies to address problems associated with the growth of Internet cigarette retailers. In 2000, Rhode Island became
the first state to pass legislation designed to prevent Internet cigarette retailers from
selling to minors. 28 Before shipping a tobacco product into Rhode Island, Internet
cigarette retailers must obtain a copy of the customer's government-issued identifi-

Michigan Attorney General Granholm Announces Charges Filed for the Illegal Sale of Tobacco Products to Minors

over the Internet, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 20, 2000. Out of the numerous retailers caught by the Washington Attorney
General, only one asked the child operative her age. See In re Ziggy's Tobacco & Novelty (Order of Wash. State
Liquor Control Bd., Dec. 21, 1999) No. 14.8 in TOBACCO PRODUCTS LJABI.ITY REPORTER 2.492 (2000), available
at http://www.atg.wa.gov (last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
120. See Kurt M. Ribisl et al., Internet Sales of Cigarettes to Minors, 290 JAMA 1356, 1357 (2003).
121. See id. at 1357-58. Of the nine retailers (out of fifty-five total) whose websites instructed customers to
fax or mail in a copy of their photo ID, only four refused to sell because the identification was never sent. See id.
Adolescents received five percent of the deliveries and parents received nine percent of the deliveries, with only
one requiring an adult's signature. See id. at 1358.
122. See id. at 1358.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See generally Kurt M. Ribisl et al., Web Sites Selling Cigarettes: How Many Are There in the USA and
What Are Their Sales Practices?, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 352, 355 (2001) [hereinafter Ribisl et al., Web Sites]
(employing keywords and popular Internet search engines to find and examine on-line cigarette retailers).
127. K.A. Reagan etal., BlockingAccess to Online Tobacco Sales Sites, I1 TOBACCO CONTROL J. 164 (2002).
128. See P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 210, § 1; codified at R.I. Gen. Laws 1956, § 11-9-13.11
(2004).
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cation showing that he or she is at least eighteen years of age and a written attestation as to the authenticity and accuracy of the copy.' 29 Additionally, for customers
in Rhode Island, the retailer must deliver to the address listed on the identification,
and the retailer must use a delivery service that requires the signature of the
addressee or another adult. 130
Since the passage of the Rhode Island law, seven other states have passed similar
laws that explicitly attempt to impose age verification protocols on the sale and
delivery of cigarettes."'3 These laws force Internet cigarette retailers to make a meaningful inquiry as to a customer's age. Moreover, these laws counter the impression
of relative anonymity that surrounds Internet sales. As a result, minors are forced to
realize that they will no longer be able to purchase cigarettes on the Internet without
being rejected or facing other consequences.
In 2002, California passed a youth-access law that further removed this impression of anonymity by incorporating "check back" requirements.132 The new
California law states:
The distributor or seller shall submit to each credit card acquiring company
with which it has credit card sales identification information in an appropriate
form and format so that the words "tobacco product" may be printed in the purchaser's credit card statement when a purchase of a tobacco product is made by
credit card payment.
... The distributor or seller shall make a telephone call after 5 P.M. to the
purchaser confirming the order prior to shipping the tobacco products. The telephone call may be a person-to-person call or a recorded message. The distributor
or seller is not required to speak directly with33 a person and may leave a message
on an answering machine or by voice mail.
Such check-back requirements in Internet commerce were first mandated under
the Child Online Privacy Protection Act, a federal law requiring parental consent
before a website proprietor may collect personal information from a child. 134 Checkback requirements, like those mandated by California, are meant to inform parents
or guardians about their children's potentially harmful behavior that might otherwise
remain hidden. In California, parents and guardians are much more likely to know
about their children's attempts to purchase cigarettes online because they will see
the words "tobacco product" on a credit card statement or receive a telephone call
about the delivery of tobacco products in the evening. These check-back requirements also seek to intensify the minor's concern that a parent or guardian will
intercept the delivery of the tobacco products.

129. See id.
130. Id.
131. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22963 (2004); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5702 to 39-5718 (2002); IND. CODE §§
24-3-5.2-1 to 24-3-5.2-8 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1555-C to 1555-D (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 202.24935 (2004); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 161.451-161.462 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2246.7 to 18.2-246.12 (2004).

132. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22963(b)(2)-(3) (2004).
133. Id.
134. Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2001).
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As part of its new youth-access law, enacted on June 9, 2003,35 Maine developed
an enforcement provision coupled with age verification protocols. 136 The enforcement provision categorizes Internet cigarette retailers into one of two categories:
licensed or unlicensed. " Licensure of retailers has been a key component to traditional youth-access laws.138 As of 2000, twenty states had enacted statewide regulations requiring retailers to obtain a permit before selling tobacco products and pro-39
viding for suspension or revocation of those permits for repeated sales to minors. 1
Sales permits help reduce youth access to tobacco products in several ways. First,
sales permits identify tobacco retailers."4 Second, the application process gives
officials an opportunity to educate retailers about the problem of youth access and
youth-access laws.' 4 ' Third, the threat of substantial revenue loss resulting from the
42
suspension or revocation of permits motivates retailers to avoid sales to minors.
Lastly, sales permits provide "a mechanism for administrative adjudication of youth
4 3
access law violations," which is much less cumbersome than bringing a lawsuit.
Maine enforces its youth-access law, in part, by prohibiting shipping companies
from delivering tobacco products into Maine from unlicensed Internet cigarette
retailers.'"4 The relevant provision reads:
The Attorney General shall maintain lists of licensed tobacco retailers and
known unlicensed tobacco retailers. The Attorney General shall provide to a
delivery service lists of licensed tobacco retailers and known unlicensed tobacco
retailers. The list of known unlicensed tobacco retailers is confidential. A
delivery service that receives a list of known unlicensed tobacco retailers shall
maintain the confidentiality of the list.'45
The updated list is then transferred to delivery services operating in Maine, such as
Federal Express or United Parcel Service.' Under the Maine law, the delivery
service is responsible
47 for ensuring that it does not ship goods from an unlicensed
retailer into Maine.
135. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. lit. 22, §§ 1551, 1555-C to 1555-D (2003).
136. See id.§§ 1555-A to 1555-D.
137. See id. § 1555-D.
138. INST. OF MED., GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND
YOUTHS 211 (Barbara S. Lynch & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 1994).

139. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 64 (identifying Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin). It should be noted that ten
other states, including Massachusetts, MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 62C, § 67 (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 64C, § 2 (West 2001), require tobacco retailers to obtain a state-issued license to sell tobacco products. Id.
Tobacco licenses are also used at the municipal level. As of July 2000, approximately 250 Massachusetts munici-

palities require sales permits. D.J. WILSON, MASSACHUSETTS MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION, MAPS DENOTING LOCAL
TOBACCO CONTROL REGULATIONS (2000), available at http://www.mahb.orgltobacco/massmapslMassMaps.htm

(last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
140. SATCHER, supra note 71 ("The lack of a current and accurate list of tobacco vendors has been cited by
many states involved in Synar enforcement as a serious impediment to efficient enforcement.") (citation omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C.
Id.

146. The Maine law includes the U.S. Postal Service. The U.S. Postal Service has adopted regulations
whereby it will not deliver to states products known to be banned by the state. Id.
147. Id.
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There are numerous benefits to Maine's approach. First, the state can avoid the
expense and legal complexities of prosecuting an Internet cigarette retailer located
in another state or beyond the state's reach on a tribal reservation. 4 8 The state also
avoids the necessity of taking enforcement actions against hundreds of Internet
cigarette retailers who sell to children. Instead, the state can achieve its goal by more
efficiently terminating the retailers' ability to deliver their goods through the use of
a handful of delivery services.
In the future, advances in technology may present additional age verification
options that states may wish to encourage or require Internet cigarette retailers to
use. For example, a state youth-access law could require a "face-to-face interaction
or other equally reliable" age verification protocol.'49 The law could identify one or
more pre-approved "safe harbor" protocols "without mandating that any particular
approach be used."' 5 0 Such protocols might include notarized copies of photographic
identifications, web cameras, or some form of bioinformatics, such as voice or
finger print identification.' 5 '
States may also want to consider additional regulations aimed at protecting
residents from Internet-based cigarette sales. For example, a state might require
retailers, including Internet retailers, to disclose information to potential customers
and provide customers the opportunity to terminate the transaction upon reading the
information. 52 Once the shipping information is collected, the retailer would know
exactly what information the customer's state requires it to display. The content of
the disclosure could consist of a minimum age warning, steps the retailer is required
to take to verify the customer's age, the persons or government agencies that will
be notified, and the like. States might also proscribe the format and time period for
the disclosure so that the information is not hidden in a link or slow pop-up or
flashes by quickly.
Each of these different approaches has its own advantages and disadvantages and,
until they are enacted and studied over time, their efficacy cannot be established.
None can be expected to totally prevent minors from obtaining cigarettes, but many
offer the possibility of reducing such sales and thus preventing some young people
from becoming addicted. Moreover, the enactment of these different approaches
provides models for other states and perhaps even Congress to consider when they
address the problem. In effect, these different approaches are examples of the
laboratories of democracy permitted by our federalism.'53 Whether the Constitution,

148. Over half of the Internet cigarette retailers located in the United States are located on tribal lands, see
Ribisl et al., Web Sites, supranote 126, at 355, where tribal sovereignty places the retailers beyond the reach of state
enforcements. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
149. DOUGLAS BLANKE, MINN. DEP'T OF PUBLIC HEALTH, SMOKE ON THE WEB: CAN CHILDREN BUY
CIGARETTEs ONLINE? 22 (2002), available at http:lwww.health.state.mn.us/divslhpcdltpclsmoke-on-the-web.pdf

(last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
150. See id.
151. See id. at 22-23.
152. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000), prohibits states from
mandating health warnings, but states may require cigarette retailers to notify customers of their tax responsibilities,
minimum age sales laws, or other state youth-access laws.
153. New State Ice Co. v. Liebemann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
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however, permits these attempts by the states to protect their young residents from
tobacco remains to be seen. In large part, that depends upon the value that courts
place upon public health policies when they consider the impact of state laws on
interstate commerce.
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND PUBLIC HEALTH
A. The Origins of and Rationalesfor the Dormant Commerce Clause
There are many possible constitutional limitations to state efforts to reduce the
sale of cigarettes to minors over the Internet.'54 Especially problematic is the socalled dormant Commerce Clause. Because of the very nature of the Internet, its
commerce is almost inevitably interstate, or even international. As a result, all state
laws that aim to reduce the ability of minors to purchase tobacco over the Internet
implicate interstate commerce and are subject to review under the dormant Comstates from discriminatmerce Clause-a judge-made doctrine that seeks to prevent
55
ing against or unduly burdening interstate commerce.
The doctrine dates back to the early days of the nineteenth century. Said to derive
from the Constitution's grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce among
the states, the doctrine may have initially stemmed from the notion that once states
gave away such powers to Congress, they no longer retained any power over interstate commerce. 156 This "exclusive power[s]" rationale, however, quickly dissipated
due to the recognition that there were some matters affecting interstate commerce
that the states were far better suited to regulate than was Congress.157 In place of the
exclusive powers rationale, courts developed alternative theories as to why federal
courts should limit, in the absence of congressional action, state laws that impinge
upon commerce. Two rationales are frequently cited: first, that the Constitution
attempted to establish open markets between the states and that state laws that
interfered with those open markets could undermine not only trade, but national
unity; 1 8 and second, that a state's political actors may be unduly willing to place the
costs of the state's regulatory policies on out-of-state economic interests that are

154. Depending upon the nature of the state regulation and the degree to which it affects the ability of sellers
to convey information or market their goods, First Amendment issues may arise. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525 (2001). State laws may also violate the Supremacy Clause if they are preempted by federal statutes.
Id. at 540-42. In addition, states may face problems under the Due Process Clause when they attempt to exert
jurisdiction (including the power to tax) over out-of-state sites. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,
309-17 (1992).
155. See infra text accompanying note 156.
156. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824).
157. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 320-21 (1851).
158. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949):
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall
be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the
Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs
duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition
from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the
vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.
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generally unrepresented within the state. 159 In other words, the political system
cannot be trusted to work when states enact laws that disfavor out-of-state interests.
Regardless of the rationale, judicial enforcement of the dormant Commerce
Clause is inherently problematic for at least three reasons. First, despite the frequent
invocation of the phrase "dormant Commerce Clause," there simply is no such
clause in the Constitution. For a judiciary that at least purports to cherish textual
fidelity and disdain judicial activism, the dormant Commerce Clause is troubling,
as Justice Scalia has noted.' Second, the need for judicial action in this area is
questionable given the undoubted ability of Congress to use its powers to preempt
state regulations that it finds offensive to out-of-state interests. 161 Indeed, inany
discussion of the dormant Commerce Clause, it is critical to recall that the
conversation is about what the states may and may not do in the absence of congressional action. If state laws are deeply offensive to other states, or if they seriously
threaten the national economy, Congress can intervene and establish national
standards, as it so often has. 162 This raises the question of why judicial action is
pressing. Finally, as shall be discussed more below, almost any action undertaken
by a state in furtherance of its traditional police power objectives has the potential
to negatively impact out-of-state economic interests. 163 As a result, the dormant
Commerce Clause has been called "a nuclear bomb of a legal theory,"' 64 a doctrine
with the apparent potential to destroy everything in its wake.
For the most part, however, the actual impact of the dormant Commerce Clause
on state police power laws has been far from nuclear. For much of our constitutional
history, courts readily and somewhat reflexively distinguished "true" police power
laws from more troubling laws that appeared to be designed to protect local interests
to the disadvantage of out-of-state interests.165 Under this approach, the state laws
that were in jeopardy were those that accomplished their goal (including the
protection of public health) in a manner that so unnecessarily burdened out-of-state
interests as to raise a great suspicion as to their actual objective." 6 Hence, although
the Court in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison167 accepted that cities could regulate
to ensure the sanitary condition and wholesomeness of milk, the Supreme Court
struck down a law that required all milk sold within the city to be pasteurized within

159. This view is often attributed to the opinion of Justice Stone in South CarolinaState Highway Department
v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938), in which he stated:
Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, that when
the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state,
legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally
exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.
Id. at 184-85 n.2.
160. E.g., Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 296 § 111.D (3d ed. 1996).
162. See, e.g., In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 564-65 (upholding Wilson Act). But see Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314
U.S. 390, 400 (1941) ("[Such] restraints are individually too petty, too diversified, and too local to get the attention
of a Congress hard pressed with more urgent matters.").
163. See infra Part ll.B.
164. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 18, at 787 (quoting Declan McCullagh, Brick by Brick, TIME DIGITAL
DAILY, Jan. 31, 1997).

165. See supra Part I.B.
166. See, e.g., Fort GratiotSanitaryLandfill, 504 U.S. at 366.
167. 340U.S. 349 (1951).
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five miles of the city. 168 The regulation, the Court stated, "plainly'discriminates
against interstate commerce," something that the city could not do "even in the
exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people."' 69
Thus, although the Court has long accepted that the states have the power to protect
public health, it has also recognized that so-called public health statutes may in fact
disfavor interstate commerce. Accepting the states' ability to protect the public
health while preventing them from using that authority to promote local economic
interests to the detriment of interstate interests has proven a challenge to the courts.
B. DiscriminatoryLaws
By the 1970s, the Court had appeared to settle upon a relatively simple doctrine
170
that lessened the value or weight given to a state's attempt to protect the public.
Under the Court's ruling in City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey,'7 ' state laws that
overtly discriminated against out-of-state interests were per se unconstitutional, even
if they purported to protect pubic health. 72 Thus, in sharp contrast to the approach
used in the nineteenth century, 7 1 if discrimination were found, the public health
rationale for the law was given little, if any, weight. 174 Despite this apparent disregard of a state's public health goals, the City of Philadelphiadecision on its own
need not have presented a significant threat to a state's ability to protect public
health. In most circumstances, states can achieve their public health goals without
overtly discriminating against out-of-state interests. Perhaps only when a state
imposes a quarantine on goods or people arriving from an infected region must a
state intentionally discriminate
between in-state and out-of-state interests in its effort
75
to protect public health.
However, the Court quickly made it clear that a state law need not seek to burden
out-of-state commerce in order to be found to be discriminatory and subject to per
se invalidation under the dormant Commerce Clause. For example, in C&A
Carbone,Inc., v. Town of Clarkstown,176 the Supreme Court found unconstitutional
a municipal ordinance that required all solid waste within the town to be deposited

168. Id.
169. Id. at 354.
170. The Court's modem dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is often thought to date to Justice Stone's
1945 opinion in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,770-71 (1945). In that decision, the Court appeared
to adopt an all-purpose balancing test, rejecting prior tests that looked to whether a state regulation "directly" or
"indirectly" affected commerce, or whether the area to be regulated was of national or local interest. See S. Pac. Co.,
325 U.S. at 770-71; Peter C. Felmly, Comment, Beyond the Reach of States: The Dormant Commerce Clause,
ExtraterritorialState Regulation, and the Concerns of Federalism,55 ME. L. REv. 467, 475 n.59 (2003). By the
1970s, however, the Court clearly modified that approach by announcing the per se rule discussed in the text while
not explicitly rejecting it.
171. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
172. Id. at 629.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 26-37.
174. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 628-29.
175. The Court discussed the so-called quarantine exception in City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 628-29. The
Court stated that it upheld quarantines involving "the importation of articles such as diseased livestock that required
destruction as soon as possible because their very movement risked contagion and other evils." Id.; see also Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding law prohibiting the importation of live baitfish because the baltfish would
import disease and upset the aquatic ecology).
176. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
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at a local waste transfer station.177 On its face, the ordinance appeared to be aimed
not at harming out-of-state commerce, but at financing the city's efforts to dispose
of its solid waste. 78 Nevertheless, finding that the ordinance effectively required
disposers of waste in the city to favor the municipal station to the detriment of
cheaper facilities, including any that might exist out-of-state, the Court deemed the
ordinance discriminatory and per se unconstitutional. 179 As a result, the ordinance's
potential usefulness in promoting solid waste disposal, and therefore protecting the
environment and the public health, did not enter into the majority's analysis.
Consequently, state acts that favor local commerce, even if they do so to promote
traditional police power objectives, may be found per se unconstitutional regardless
of their public health impact.
Perhaps more relevant to the states' ability to control Internet sales of tobacco are
a series of recent cases before the courts of appeals concerning state liquor control
laws. 80 Several states have laws that prohibit unlicensed dealers from selling liquor
within the states.' 8 ' These laws are usually justified by the states as part of their
liquor control laws, designed to regulate the sale 8of
liquor, and, not incidentally, to
2
ensure that liquor taxes are paid within the state.
Although these laws do not usually impose a complete ban against out-of-state
sellers, because they allow such sellers to seek a license in the state, several courts
of appeals have found them to constitute unconstitutional discrimination in violation
of the dormant Commerce Clause. 1 3 As these courts see it, the very requirement of
having a license within the state is a form of discrimination against out-of-state
sellers.8 4 In effect, the courts conclude that the licensing requirement evidences a
form of protectionism sufficient to establish discrimination even in the absence of
a statute that discriminates on its face. Other circuits have found that the statutes are
saved by virtue of the Twenty-First Amendment, which grants states authority to
regulate alcohol. 85 But these courts have also assumed that, but for the Twenty-First
Amendment, the liquor licensing statutes would violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. 18 6 Whether the Twenty-First Amendment does indeed provide this
exemption will likely be answered this term as the Supreme Court reviews two of

177. Id. at 389-92.

178. See id at 410-11 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. For a discussion of these cases and laws, see Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and the Banditin Cyberspace,
19 CONST. COMMENT 297 (2002).
181. See infra notes 210-215.
182. See Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcohol DirectShipment Laws, The Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First
Amendment, 85 VA. L. REv. 353, 355-59 (1999). For a listing and analysis of state laws, see WINE INSTITUTE,
DIRECT SHIPMENT OF LAWS BY STATE FOR WINERIES, at http://www.wineinstitute.org/shipwineanalysis/
introanalysis.htm (last modified Aug. 11, 2004).
183. E.g., Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. grantedsub nom. Granhom v. Heald, 124 S.
Ct. 2389 (2004); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir.
2003).
184. See infra notes 210-215.
185. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cit. 2004), cert. granted,124 S. Ct. 2391 (2004); Bridenbaugh
v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000).
186. E.g., Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851.
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these cases." 7 It is less clear whether the Court's opinions will also shed light on the
underlying dormant Commerce Clause issue.
The vulnerability of traditional public health laws to the claim that they effectively discriminate against out-of-state commerce and, thus, are per se unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause is also evident from cases that deal with
the licensing of professional services. For example, the Federal District Court of
Puerto Rico has questioned the constitutionality of an interpretation of a Puerto Rico
law that licensed pharmacists. 8 ' And although courts have not yet found state
medical licensing laws per se unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause,
these laws are potentially vulnerable to the same analysis applied in the liquor cases,
especially to the extent that medical licensing laws limit the ability of out-of-state
physicians to practice medicine over the Internet. I8 9 In effect, as the interstate and
cyberspace practice of the professions increases, licensing laws that at one time
simply appeared to protect public health or regulate a local trade suddenly appear
to impose such significant hurdles on out-of-state businesses that they can be seen
as protectionist and even discriminatory, even in the absence of facial discrimination. As a result, these laws become vulnerable to a per se analysis that precludes
any consideration of whether they do in fact protect public health or whether the
state can indeed achieve its goals in a manner less onerous to interstate commerce.
C. The Pike Balancing Test
Even when state laws are not found to be discriminatory and, therefore, per se
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause, they remain subject to fairly
rigorous review. According to established dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, state
laws that do not display "patent discrimination" against interstate economic interests
are analyzed under "a much more flexible approach,"' epitomized by the so-called
Pike balancing test.'91 Under this test, if a statute regulates evenhandedly and has
only incidental effects on interstate commerce, it is upheld unless the burdens it
imposes on commerce are "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."' 92
Although this balancing test potentially provides an opening for a consideration
of the health benefits provided by state laws, and the Court has noted that respect
must be given here to a state's goals, 93 in practice the balancing test can still impose

187. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d 223; Heald, 342 F.3d 517.
188. Nat'l Pharmacies, Inc. v. De Melecio, 51 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.P.R. 1999). The court in fact did not strike
down the statute but read it in such a way as to enable out-of-state pharmacies to become licensed within the state
without complying with some of the requirements the state traditionally imposed upon licensed pharmacies. Contra
State v. Rasmussen, 213 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 1973) (upholding pharmacy law against claim by mail order
pharmacies); Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding law requiring car
dealers to be licensed within the state).
189. Many articles have been written about the legal status of cybermedicine. E.g., Shira D. Weiner, Mouseto-Mouse Resuscitation: Cybermedicine and the Need for FederalRegulation, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1107 (2002);
Ross D. Silverman, RegulatingMedical Practicein the CyberAge: Issuesand Challengesfor State MedicalBoards,
26 AM. J.L. & MED. 255 (2000).
190. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
191. The test was named after Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
192. Id. at 142 (citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
193. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959).
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significant limits on state public health laws. Moreover, in several important cases,
the Court has demonstrated its unease with deferring to state laws that purport to be
about public health. One of the best examples of this is Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways, 94 which concerned an Iowa law limiting the length of "doubles" or
"twin" trucks to sixty feet. 95 The state claimed that the law was a safety regulation.'" Consolidated Freightways argued that the act interfered with interstate
commerce by requiring it to either detach or reroute its trucks as they passed through
Iowa. 97
In a plurality opinion, Justice Powell began by noting that although those seeking
to challenge a bona fide safety regulation must "overcome a 'strong presumption of
validity,"' the simple "incantation of a purpose to promote the public health or
safety does not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause attack."' 98 Justice Powell
then went on to review the state's evidence and concluded that the alleged safety
benefits of the statute did not justify the burden it placed on interstate commerce. 199
His discussion of the state's safety evidence provided little reason to believe that he
did in fact undertake the review with a deferential stance. To the contrary, his
approach suggested at most a neutral evaluation of the evidence and perhaps a far
more skeptical perspective on the state's public health claims than was applied to
Consolidated Freightway's claims of economic hardship.
Writing a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan rejected the idea that a court can
or should weigh the public health benefits of a statute against the burden it places
on commerce. 200 Justice Brennan stated, "In the field of safety, once the court has
established that the intended safety benefit is not illusory, insubstantial, or nonexistent, it must defer to the State's lawmakers on the appropriate balance to be
struck against other interests."20' Nevertheless, he also agreed that the Iowa statute
should be struck down because he could not accept that public safety, as opposed
to parochialism, was the state's real interest. 2° As a result, a statute that was justified
by at least a plausible public health rationale was found to violate interstate
commerce.
The debate between the Justices in Kassel demonstrates the difficulty the Court
has faced in the modem era in determining when a state statute is in fact a public
health statute that deserves deference in the face of a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge and when public health is used as a mere pretext for a statute that aims at
protecting or advantaging local economic interests. This difficulty may be traced to
numerous developments, including the propensity of states to wrap parochial
legislation in the gauze of public health, the increasing diversity and complexity of
public health regulations, and the lack of familiarity on the part of courts and

194. 450 U.S. 662 (1981); see also Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (invalidating
a Wisconsin law regulating truck length).
195. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 662.
196. Id.

197. Id.
198.

Id. at 670 (quoting Bibb, 359 U.S. at 524).

199. See id. at 671-73.
200. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 681 n. 1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
201. Id.

202. See id. at 687.
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lawyers with the languages and methodologies of public health. 2 3 Whatever the
reason, the inability of courts to undertake the Pike balancing test in a consistent
fashion has led Justice Scalia to suggest that the test should be used "rarely if at all"
and that, if a state statute does not discriminate, it should be upheld. 2" As long as
the majority rejects Justice Scalia's approach and continues to apply the balancing
test in such a way that public health goals are not consistently afforded real
deference and respect, even state public health statutes that do not discriminate
against interstate commerce will face an uncertain future when challenged under the
dormant Commerce Clause. Obviously, this risk will be magnified as the interstate
effect of the statutes increase, which is bound to occur with more commerce
occuring over the interstate Internet.
D. Extraterritoriality
State laws that purport to protect health may also be vulnerable under another
prong of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis. In Edgar v. Mite Corp.,2 5 the
Supreme Court reviewed an Illinois anti-takeover law that applied to tender offers
made to both in-state and out-of-state corporations. 2 6 Although the Court struck
down the statute, there was no majority opinion or rationale. However, writing for
himself and Justices Stevens and O'Connor, Justice White condemned the statute
both because it "direct[ly]" regulated interstate commerce and because the law had
a "sweeping extraterritorial effect."2 7
In the years following Mite, the Court continued to develop,20 8 although perhaps
not clarify, the relationship between extraterritoriality and the dormant Commerce
210
Clause. 20 9 In Brown-FormanDistillersCorp. v. New York State LiquorAuthority,
the state law required every liquor distiller or producer selling to wholesalers within
New York to affirm that the prices they charged were "no higher than the lowest
price" they sold the same product for in any other state. 2" The Supreme Court found

203. INST. OFMED., WHO WILL KEEPTHE PUBLIC HEALTHY, EDUCATING PUBLIC HEALTH WORKERS FORTHE
21ST CENTURY 143 (Kristine Gebbie et al.
eds., 2003); Richard A. Goodman et al.,
Other Branches of Science Are
Necessary to Form a Lawyer: Teaching PublicHealthLaw in Law School, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 298-301 (2002);

Wendy E. Parmet & Anthony Robbins, A Rightful Placefor PublicHealth in American Law, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
302-04 (2002).
204. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,95 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
205. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 642.
208. The Court, not surprisingly, has cited earlier cases for the genesis of the doctrine. See, e.g., BrownForman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511 (1935)).
209. The Court's opinions have been less than clear. One remaining question is whether the extraterritoriality
"prong" of the Commerce Clause provides an additional, third step in the analysis or whether it is simply a part of
the per se proscription against discrimination set forth in Philadelphia.Uncertainty also exists as to whether the
Court's discussion about the burdens imposed by inconsistent laws creates an additional element, is part of the
extraterritoriality analysis, or is part of the Pike balancing test.
See Felmly, supra note 170, at 490-91 (describing
uncertainty attending the analysis). Scholars have also debated whether the extraterritoriality analysis properly
belongs under the dormant Commerce Clause in any event. See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays, 85 MICH. L.
REv. 1865, 1873 (1987).
210. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
211. Id. at 576.
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the statute unconstitutional because once a distiller had posted its fees in New York,
it would not be free to change its prices outside of New York.212 According to the
Court, the dormant Commerce Clause forbids states from thus "project[ing]" their
regulations outside their borders.2" 3
In Healy v. The Beer Institute,1 4 another case concerning a state's liquor pricing
law,2" 5 the Supreme Court further discussed the problem of extraterritoriality.
According to the Court, statutes that control commerce occurring wholly outside of
a state exceed the "inherent limits" of a state's authority and are "invalid regardless
2 6 In
of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature.,
addition, such statutes may impose inconsistent regulations upon interstate commerce. 21 7 In effect, the Court read the dormant Commerce Clause as demanding that
actors in interstate commerce face a single set of rules.21 8 While this requirement
undoubtedly makes sense from an economic perspective, from either a federalism
or a public health perspective2" 9 it is more problematic. Federalism, after all, has
been extolled because it permits individual states to serve as "laborator[ies]" that
experiment with and showcase new regulatory policies.220 With respect to public
health, this experimentation may be crucial. Unless some state attempts to enact a
particular public health regulation (for example, a motorcycle helmet law or even
a law limiting the length of trucks), it will often be impossible to study the efficacy
of such laws and determine whether they do or do not improve public health.
Therefore, if public health laws are to be informed by science and research, we may
need to tolerate, if not encourage, inconsistent and differing regulations.2 2'
Moreover, at least theoretically, we value states and respect their sovereignty in
part because state governments are "closer" to their voters than is the federal govern-

212. Id. at 585.
213. Id. at 582-83 (quoting Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521).
214. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
215. Id. The Connecticut statute at issue required out-of-state shippers of beer to affirm that their posted prices
for products sold within the state were, as of the time of posting, no higher than those sold in bordering states.
216. Id.at 336.
217. See id. at 336-37.
218. This concern is also evident in Kassel, 450 U.S. at 671. Professors Goldsmith and Sykes suggest that
the "meaning of the inconsistent-regulations test is also unclear." Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 18, at 790. They
note that there clearly can be no blanket prohibition of disuniform regulations in a federal system. See id. at 807.
Instead, they contend that "inconsistent-regulations cases, like extraterritoriality cases, should be viewed as just
another variant of balancing analysis." Id. at 808.
219. In using this term, I mean to suggest a perspective that values an improvement in the health of a
population. For a fuller discussion of a public health perspective, see Wendy E. Parmet, Liberalism,
Communitarianism, and Public Health: Comments on Lawrence 0. Gostin's Lecture, 55 FLA. L. REv. 1221,
1233-37 (2003).
220. New State Ice Co. v. Liebemann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Denial of the right
to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."); see Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the
Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 24, 27 (noting that federalism
encourages experimentation).
221. Indeed, the inconsistency creates two populations, differing with respect to one variable. This allows for
a meaningful study of the impact of a public health regulation. If all jurisdictions are to have the same law, the only
studies that can be done are those that compare public health outcomes before and after the law.
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ment and they can better reflect the differing views and values of their populace.222
In effect, federalism recognizes that different political communities may have
differing values about important issues. 223 These values may include the relative
value of public health versus economic costs. A very stringent application of the ban
against inconsistent regulations, however, may prevent some states from imposing
such regulations because they place a higher value on public health than do their
sister states. In effect, as long as most states place a relatively low value on public
health, the regulations of states that place a higher value on it will stand out as
inconsistent and potentially vulnerable to per se invalidation under the dormant
Commerce Clause.
A recent opinion of the Supreme Court has muted that danger, at least to a
degree.224 In PharmaceuticalResearch & ManufacturersofAmerica v. Walsh,225 the
Court considered a challenge to a Maine law that attempted to improve the affordability of prescription drugs. 226 The law imposed a prior authorization requirement
for Medicaid purchases of drugs sold by companies that refused to negotiate rebates
for states that would be used to fund a reduced price drug program.227 Although most
of the Court's opinion dealt with whether the program was compatible with the
federal Medicaid law, 228 the Court also considered whether the statute constituted
an impermissible extraterritorial regulation.229 In a brief discussion by Justice
Stevens, the Court found that the statute did not impose any legal requirements that
related to an out-of-state activity. 2 0 In contrast to the laws struck down in cases such
as Healy,231 the Maine law did not tie its rebate scheme to out-of-state prices and,
thus, its extraterritorial impact was merely incidental.232 Hence, the Court in Walsh
implied that when a statute does not formally connect the state's regulation to outof-state activity, the Court will not impose the extraterritoriality doctrine and subject
the regulation to a per se analysis.233 However, the facts in Walsh did not give rise
to a claim that the statute created inconsistent regulations and, thus, Walsh leaves
222. See Calabresi, supra note 220, at 27 (Federalism "allows for decision makers to be responsive to local
tastes and conditions. If one area of a country is filled with smokers, for example, and another area has few smokers,
then statewide laws discouraging smoking may make more sense than one national law.") (citing Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism:Evaluating the FoundersDesign, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484 (1987)); cf. Lincoln L. Davies,
If You Give a Court a Commerce Clause: An Environmental Justice Critique of Supreme Court Interstate Waste
Jurisprudence, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 207, 276-79 (1999) (arguing that a stringent application of the dormant
Commerce Clause limits the participation and self-determination of local communities).
223. For a discussion of the values of federalism and the impact of limits on extraterritoriality, see Seth F.
Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 974
(2002) ("American federalism does in fact leave room for substantial variation of moral visions and legal regimes
among states, and that.. .is a strength of our system.").
224. An earlier case demonstrating such limitations was CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S.
69 (1987) (upholding state anti-takeover law that applied only to corporations incorporated within the state).
225. 538 U.S. 644 (2003).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000). The Court found that, at least on its face, the statute did not violate
the Medicaid Act. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 644.
229. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 644.
230. Id. at 645.
231. 491 U.S. 324; see supra text accompanying notes 214-218.
232. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 645.
233. It does, of course, trigger the Pike balancing test. But the Court in Walsh also found that the state plan
did not impose a disparate burden on out-of-state interests. 538 U.S. at 670.
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open the possibility that a per se analysis will be used when a health law results in
inconsistent regulations, even if there is no formal attempt to regulate or tie the
state's law to out-of-state activity.
Despite Walsh's important reminder that the extraterritoriality doctrine does not
apply to all state regulations that may affect out-of-state commerce (and hence does
not subsume and replace the balancing test normally used for such laws), 2" the brief
opinion in Walsh does suggest that the extraterritoriality prong of the dormant
Commerce Clause does apply to state laws that deal with public health. Indeed, the
Court's discussion of extraterritoriality in Walsh is notable for the absence of any
consideration of the importance or nature of the state regulation. The fact that the
state was attempting to increase access to prescription drugs, rather than ensure that
its citizens obtain the lowest possible prices for alcohol, was mentioned nowhere.
In effect, the public health goals of the state seemed irrelevant to the extraterritoriality analysis, leaving open the possibility that state laws that expressly apply
to or are tied to out-of-state activity may be subject to a per se analysis, which would
leave no room for a consideration of their public health value.
E. State Sales Taxes
Before concluding this brief overview of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and its impact on state public health laws, one other area of the doctrine,
one that is theoretically related to the problem of extraterritoriality, deserves
discussion. The Supreme Court has long held that the dormant Commerce Clause
limits the ability of states to tax or impose burdens relating to taxation on out-ofstate businesses.23 Interestingly, the case law analyzing this aspect of the dormant
Commerce Clause has had a life of its own and has not followed the contours that
the Court has laid for analyzing other forms of state regulation.
In 1992, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,236 the Supreme Court reviewed its
approach under the dormant Commerce Clause to state tax laws. 237 The state law at
issue in Quill required out-of-state mailorder houses that sold goods within North
Dakota to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use in the state. 238 The
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, first differentiated the analysis
appropriate under the Due Process Clause, which prohibits states from unfairly
taxing entities that lack a sufficient nexus with the state, from that under the dormant
Commerce Clause.239 Justice Stevens found that the two constitutional clauses
"differ fundamentally, in several ways." 2' The Due Process Clause is concerned
with whether the regulated entity has "minimum contacts" with the state, which
need not be physical.24' If a foreign corporation "purposefully avails itself of the

234. See supra Part Ill.C.
235. For a review of the Supreme Court's doctrine in-this area, see Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,
309-17 (1992).
236. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 301.
239. Id. at 305.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 307.
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benefits of an economic market in the forum State," the Due Process Clause does
not prohibit the imposition of a collection duty.242
In contrast, the Court found that the dormant Commerce Clause did in fact
prohibit such an obligation.243 Relying heavily on an earlier case, Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady,2 4 the Quill Court stated that a state tax would survive a
Commerce Clause challenge only if it "[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the
State., 245 Focusing on the first factor, the Court stated that while the Due Process
Clause' s minimum contacts requirement reflected concerns for fairness, the dormant
Commerce Clause's substantial nexus criteria was designed to limit a state's burden
on commerce. 246 To that end, the Court concluded that bright line rules, such as that
earlier articulated in NationalBellas Hess, Inc. v. Departmentof Revenue,247 should
be respected under the dormant Commerce Clause. 248 Hence, the dormant Commerce Clause would be read to prohibit requiring out-of-state retailers, whose only
connection with a state is through a common carrier, from collecting taxes for the
state.249
The use tax at issue in Quill was a simple revenue-generating tax without public
health ambitions. However, states (and the federal government) have long used the
power to tax to influence behaviors and promote public health. 250 Tobacco taxes are
particularly robust public health tools. The U.S. Surgeon General and the National
Cancer Institute have cited tobacco taxation as one of the most effective means of
reducing smoking.25 As discussed earlier, these taxes appear to be especially
efficacious with respect to minors, who are in general far more price-sensitive than
adults.252 Under Quill, however, the positive public health role that tobacco taxes
may play in reducing youth smoking is essentially irrelevant: out-of-state retailers
that rely wholly on a common carrier to transport their wares into a state cannot be
directly taxed, nor can they be required by a state to collect use taxes. 253 The
implication of this bright line rule that totally precludes any consideration of the
242. Id. This holding rejected the reasoning of NationalBellas Hess, Inc. v. Departmentof Revenue, 386 U.S.
753, 756 (1967).
243.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.

244.
245.
246.
247.

430 U.S. 274 (1977).
504 U.S. at 311 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 279) (alterations in original).
Id. at 312.
386 U.S. 753 (1967).

248.

Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 504 U.S. at 315.

249. Id.
250. LAWRENCE 0. GosTiN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 35-40 (2000).
251. See SATCHER, supra note 71, at 355-56; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHANGING
ADOLESCENT SMOKING PREVALENCE, SMOKING AND TOBACCO CONTROL MONOGRAPH NO. 14, at 193-99(2001).

252. See supra text accompanying note 91; see also Banthin, supra note 16, at 331 (stating that youth are
"three times more sensitive to cigarette prices than adults").
253. Under the Jenkins Act, however, any person or business that ships cigarettes to a state imposing a tax
on tobacco products must disclose to state tax officials the name and address of the shipper and the person to whom
the cigarettes are shipped. 15 U.S.C. § 376 (2001). States are then responsible for collecting the use tax from the
customers, an undertaking that is obviously inefficient and unwieldy. Moreover, studies have shown that many
retailers have failed to follow their obligation under the act to disclose consumer names to the states. For a
discussion of whether the states may enforce the Jenkins Act under a private right of action, see Banthin, supra note
16, at 341-44.
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public health impact of a state policy is discussed further below in connection with
the discussion of Internet sales of tobacco products.254
F. The Dormant Commerce Clause Meets Cyberspace
Over the last 200 years, new technologies have repeatedly presented challenges
for state health regulations.255 In the last decade, the development and expansion of
the Internet has posed perhaps the most formidable challenge to date. By its very
nature, the Internet is an international marketplace, with goods advertised and sold
from remote, "virtual" locales. Because of this configuration, laws that regulate the
Internet, either directly or indirectly, invariably have an obvious impact on interstate
commerce and are vulnerable to dormant Commerce Clause challenges. Given the
rigorousness of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, and the inconsistent respect
given to state public health laws under it, 256 the ability of the states to protect the
health of their population from goods sold or activity conducted via the Internet is
left in doubt.
Despite the importance of the problem, relatively few cases have examined the
impact of the dormant Commerce Clause on state regulations affecting Internet
sales. 257 Among the decided cases most relevant for our purposes are those dealing
with state laws protecting minors from inappropriate sexual material or conduct
258 and those seeking to regulate the sale of
occurring as a result of the Internet
259
pharmaceuticals over the Internet.
In some ways, the state statutes that seek to protect minors from obscene material
or sexual solicitation would seem among the most useful to an analysis of the
dormant Commerce Clause's impact upon public health. Protection of minors is,
after all, among the best established of state powers. Nevertheless, several courts
have found that the dormant Commerce Clause gives states little leeway to protect
children from sexual material on the Internet.26

254. See infra Part IV.B.
255. See Kevin Outterson, Health Care, Technology and Federalism, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 503 (discussing
how the respective roles of the federal government and the states have shifted in response to developments in
technology).
256. See supra Part fl].C.
257. There are, however, several cases that deal with the First Amendment implications of either federal or
state efforts to regulate pornography on the web. E.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004); Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2001); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler,
55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (1999) (discussing how a state law making it illegal to display or transmit sexually explicit
material to minors on the web violates the First Amendment); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999)
(discussing how a state law criminalizing dissemination of computer material harmful to minors violates the First
Amendment); People v. Foley, 94 N.Y.2d 668 (2000) (upholding New York statute against First Amendment attack
because the statute only applies to "intentional luring"). Other cases have considered whether courts may obtain
jurisdiction over websites that have no physical in-state presence. The leading case in this area is Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (stating that personal
jurisdiction depends upon "the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet").
258. See infra notes 260-287 and accompanying text.
259. See infra notes 288-299 and accompanying text.
260. It is possible that the decisions discussed below have been influenced by looming First Amendment
concerns. Indeed, in many of the cases, the court also considered First Amendment challenges. Once the court
concludes (or at least suspects) that the state regulation is not itself proper under the First Amendment, the "value"
or appropriate weight to be given to the state regulation in a Commerce Clause analysis is almost assuredly
diminished.
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The most influential decision is American Library Ass'n v. Pataki,26' which
concerned a New York statute that prohibited the knowing distribution over the
Internet to a minor of any material deemed "harmful to minors. 262 In analyzing
whether the state law violated the dormant Commerce Clause, the federal district
court, per Judge Preska, provided a rich description of the Internet, analogizing it
to a "highway or railroad," which requires analysis akin to that provided for state
regulation of those entities.263 Judge Preska then went on to explain the "unique
nature" of the "borderless world" of the Internet,26 where websites could be
accessed by viewers from multiple jurisdictions, without the website's sponsor ever
intending or planning to engage with any particular jurisdiction.265 As a result of this
structure, the court wrote, state regulations might subject any single site to
"haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation by states that
266
the actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being accessed.",
Hence, the court found that the state's law represented an unconstitutional, extraterritorial projection of New York's law and an excessive burden on interstate
commerce. 267 The court concluded that "the Internet is one of those areas of
commerce that must be marked off as a national preserve to protect users from
inconsistent legislation., 268 In effect, any state law applying to the Internet, no
matter what its purpose, would violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
Several courts have reached similar decisions in cases pertaining to state regulation of obscenity or even child pornography in cyberspace.269 For example, in
Cyberspace Communications,Inc. v. Engler,27 ° the court found that a Michigan law
making it illegal to communicate, display, or transmit "sexually explicit" material
to a minor over the Internet or a computer network violated the dormant Commerce
Clause. 27' Although the Act only proscribed speech that either originated or ended
in Michigan, the court noted that all speech on the net is effectively available everywhere.272 As a result, the state was projecting its law beyond its boundaries,
effectively violating the extraterritoriality prong of the dormant Commerce
Clause.273 In addition, the court found that the statute could not survive the Pike
balancing test because of the heavy burden the regulation placed on commerce and

261. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
262. Id. at 163 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 235.20(6)).
263. Id. at 161. The court's description of the geography of the Internet has been harshly criticized. See
Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 18, at 816.
264. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 168.
265. Professors Goldsmith and Sykes take issue with the Court's description of the geography of the Internet
and argue that it is easier to impose some state-specific regulations than the courts assume. See Goldsmith & Sykes,
supra note 18, at 816.

266. 969 F. Supp. at 168-69.
267. Id. at 169.

268. Id.
269. E.g., ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611

(W.D. Va. 2000).
270. 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
271. Id.at 753.
272. Id.at 751.
273. Id.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35

the statute's inability to protect minors from websites overseas." 4 Thus, the state's
public health goal was given little weight because the state could not demonstrate
that its law would completely protect minors from sexual material.275 Disturbingly,
in reaching this conclusion, the court never explained why no deference was owed
to the state goal of protecting minors, or why the protection of minors from some
harmful material was not itself a sufficient state goal. In effect, the state's goals
evaporated under the court's analysis.
Some state courts, however, have given greater weight to the state's police power
and have demonstrated the ways in which state police power regulations can survive
in the Internet age. In People v. Foley,276 for example, the state court upheld a New
York law that made it criminal to use a computer to "importune, invite or induce"
a minor to have sexual relations.277 Analyzing the dormant Commerce Clause
challenge brought by the criminal defendant, the court stated that the statute did not
discriminate against or burden interstate commerce. 278 Rather it "regulates the
conduct of individuals who intend to use the Internet to endanger the welfare of
children. 279 Importantly, the statute at issue in Foley was different from that under
consideration in Pataki because it only applied to actors that intended contact with
a minor located within the state. 280 The regulation of obscene material under discussion in Pataki applied to any website that cast out into cyberspace obscene
material that might be viewed by minors, whether or not the defendant intended
282
28
further contact with a minor within the state. ' Likewise in People v. Barrows,
the court distinguished Pataki in upholding a decision that some counts of a
conviction for using the Internet to solicit a minor to engage in sexual relations did
not violate the Commerce Clause.283 In an opinion that focused primarily on First
Amendment issues, the court agreed with Pataki, holding that the Internet was a
unique interstate phenomenon and that the dormant Commerce Clause forbids
convicting an individual for disseminating "pure speech" via the Internet. 284 Nevertheless, the court noted that the case before it was not a facial challenge of the
statute, but a criminal conviction of a defendant who clearly had attempted to use
the Internet to harm a minor in New York.285 The Commerce Clause did not forbid,
the court found, convicting the defendant for that intention based in part upon his
cyberchat messages to an individual he thought was a minor.286 In effect, in
reviewing a criminal conviction for activity that was directed specifically at a New
York minor, the court focused less on the statute's hypothetical burden on com-

274. Goldsmith and Sykes pointedly criticize this argument, which also appeared in Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at
177. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 18, at 822.
275. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 183-84.
276. 94 N.Y.2d 668 (2000).
277. Id. at 677.
278. Id. at 684.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 676.
281. 969 F. Supp. at 160.
282. 677 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1998), aftd, 273 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
283. Id. at 685-86.
284. Id. at 681, 685.
285. Id. at 680-81.
286. See id. at 686.
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merce and more on287the harm to an individual minor within the state that the statute
sought to prevent.
A second set of decisions that even more clearly implicate public health relates
to state regulation of the sale of prescription drugs. 288 Although a "system of complementary federal and state authority" regulates the sale and marketing of
prescription drugs, 289 states have long exercised their police power to license pharmacists and oversee the sale of such drugs. 2" Even before the advent of the Internet,
state regulatory authority over pharmacies was challenged by the establishment of
mailorder pharmacies.29 1 In 1973, for example, a state court reviewed a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge to an Iowa law that prohibited pharmacies from filling
prescriptions issued by physicians not licensed within the state.292 After affirming
the state's traditional power to protect the health of its residents, the court found that
the statute was constitutional as it applied to practitioners registered under the
Federal Controlled Substances Act in Iowa.293 However, to the extent that the state
tried to prevent the pharmacy from filling prescriptions issued by out-of-state physi294
cians, the court found that the statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause.
Interestingly, this conclusion was reached even though it meant that the state could
not prevent its residents from purchasing prescriptions from unqualified dealers.

287. See also Hatch v. Super. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to a conviction for using the Internet to seduce a minor). The court in Hatch wrote that the Internet cannot
be used to insulate pedophiles from prosecution and that the statute does not have an extraterritorial effect because
there is no reason to believe that the state would apply the law in situations in which the minor seduced was not instate. Id. at 471-72.
288. The courts have also considered the relationship between the dormant Commerce Clause and the Internet
in a few cases that deal with state anti-spamming laws. See Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258
(Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting Pataki and upholding state regulation of unsolicited email against Commerce Clause
attack because the statute did not have an unlimited geographic reach since it only applied to email coming from
or into California); State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001) (upholding state regulation of email with
misrepresentation in subject line or transmission path). One scholar suggests that the distinctions between Heckel
and Pataki can be explained due to the distinction between the websites and email. See Michelle Armond, Note,
Cyberlaw: Regulating Conduct on the Internet,State Internet Regulationand the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 379, 396 (2002).

289. Linda C. Fentiman, Internet Pharmaciesand the Need for a New Federalism: Protecting Consumers
While Increasing Access to PrescriptionDrugs, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 119, 125, 145 (2003).
290. A great number of articles have been written about the impact of the Internet on the sale and regulation
of pharmaceuticals as well as on the practice of medicine. Relevant works include: David B. Brushwood, Responsive
Regulation of Internet PharmacyPractice, 10 ANNALS HEALTH L. 75 (2001); Sara E. Zeman, Regulation of Online
Pharmacies:A Casefor Cooperative Federalism, 10 ANNALS HEALTH L. 105 (2001); Weiner, supra note 189;
Patricia Stolfi, Comment, Caveat Emptor: Regulating the On-Line Medicine Man in the New Frontier, 17 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 377 (2000). See also U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., INTERNET PHARMACIES: ADDING
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS WOULD AID STATE AND FEDERAL OVERSIGHT (GAO-01-69 2000) (discussing issues
pertaining to the Internet and pharmacies therein), available at http:llwww.gpoaccess.gov/gaoreports (last visited
Jan. 3, 2005).
291. Commentators have noted that mailorder as well as Internet pharmacies may provide benefits to
consumers by reducing the cost of prescription drugs and increasing patient autonomy. See Brushwood, supra note
290, at 77. On the other hand, many Internet pharmacies have been willing to dispense prescription drugs without
a prescription or after issuing the consumer a simple questionnaire. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 290, at
11.
292. State v. Rasmussen, 213 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 1973).
293. Id. at 668.
294. Id. The court also found that such a construction of the state's statute would violate the Federal
Controlled Substances Act. Id. Most of the opinion's discussion was devoted to this statutory issue. Id.
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More recently, a federal district court considered a Puerto Rico law that required
all pharmacists practicing within the Commonwealth to be registered with the
Commonwealth. 295 The court recognized that the statute was a health law, but noted
that even health laws were limited by the dormant Commerce Clause. 296 The court
then went on to decide that in order to avoid a constitutional invalidation of the
Commonwealth's regulation, it would construe the requirement as not applying to
out-of-state pharmacies.297 Hence, the law was read to impose requirements only on
pharmacies actually operating within the Commonwealth.29
In both of these cases, the courts managed to reconcile the police power regulation with the Commerce Clause by narrowing the regulation's construction. In so
doing, the courts attempted to reduce the statute's effect upon interstate commerce.
The courts did not carefully consider, however, the impact of their narrowing
construction on the health and safety of the local citizens. 299 Indeed, they had no
methodology or approach for evaluating or assessing the public health impact of
their saving construction. The focus of the analysis, once again, was on the burdens
on interstate commerce and the impermissibility of the extra-territorial projection
of state law. How public safety could be protected in an age of Internet commerce
was left unconsidered.
IV. STATE REGULATION OF TOBACCO AND THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. The Cases to Date
In light of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp."'° denying the Food and Drug Administration jurisdiction over
tobacco products, 30 1 and Congress's unwillingness to enact legislation that regulates
the sale of tobacco, the states continue to play the dominant role in protecting their
residents, and especially their young residents, from the dangers of tobacco.3" 2 In the
last several years, however, many state tobacco regulations have faced the challenge
of the dormant Commerce Clause. As we have seen, the current doctrine is not
especially auspicious for state laws that seek to protect public health. In this part, we
describe how courts have thus far reviewed tobacco regulations under the dormant
Commerce Clause. In the section that follows, we consider how different types of

295. Nat'l Pharms., Inc. v. De Melecio, 51 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.P.R. 1999).
296. Id. at 56.
297. Id. at 61.
298. Id. Although the facts are slightly different, another noteworthy case concerning pharmaceuticals is Knoll
Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Sherman, 57 F. Supp. 2d 615 (N.D. IM. 1999), which found that an Illinois statute
prohibiting the advertising of controlled substances by name violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The court
found that the state law's burden on commerce was "excessive in relation to the speculative benefits for Illinois
citizens" and that the statute had an extraterritorial reach. Id. at 623.
299. This was more of a question in National Pharmacies when the court limited the ability of the
Commonwealth to prevent the importation of prescription drugs maled by pharmacies that did not comport with
local standards. 51 F. Supp. 2d 45. In Rasmussen the issue was the export of such drugs, which raised issues for the
health of residents of other states. 213 N.W.2d 661.
300. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
301. Id. at 161.
302. For futher discussion of congressional action and inaction, see infra Part V.
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state laws aimed at reducing the sale of tobacco products over the Internet may and
should fare under a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
• Several cases decided in the last few years by the courts of appeals offer some
clues as to how tobacco control regulations fare under the anvil of the dormant Commerce Clause. ConsolidatedCigarCorp. v. Reilly3" 3 considered a Massachusetts law
that made it unlawful to advertise any cigars in the state without applying a warning
label. 3" The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recognized that warning labels
for cigars were "unquestionably a legitimate local public interest," but nevertheless
found that the burden placed upon interstate commerce would be "excessive" since
it would require any out-of-state publication that might be viewed in Massachusetts
to include the label.3"5 In addition, the court found that the state's requirement that
cigars be packaged with warning labels violated the dormant Commerce Clause
because the regulation would require all manufacturers, even those that do not
intend to sell their cigars in Massachusetts, to include the warning label due to the
mere possibility that a package would slip into the state. 3' 6 Critically, in neither part
of the opinion did the court explain why the burdens on interstate commerce
outweighed the health benefits that the state hoped to achieve due to its regulation.
As in the Patakicase, the focus was squarely on the burdens that the state regulation
would impose on commercial entities acting in interstate commerce.
The same court seemed to reach a potentially inconsistent conclusion the next
year in PhillipMorris, Inc. v. Reilly.3 7 This case raised a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to a Massachusetts law that required tobacco companies to disclose their
ingredients.30 8 Looking at the statute before it, the court found that the disclosure law
did not purport to regulate commerce across state lines, nor was it aimed at affecting
national tobacco policy. 3°9 The only impact on interstate commerce, the court
concluded, was incidental, and was more than offset by the health benefits provided
by the statute, which the court again left vague.3 l° Why these health benefits were
more worthy of consideration than those at issue in Consolidated Cigar was not
made clear.
The issue of Internet sales was placed more squarely before the court in Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki.31t The New York law at issue in the case
aimed to reduce illegal sales to minors by prohibiting all direct-to-consumer delivery

303. 218 F.3d 30 (lst Cir. 2000), aff'd in part on other grounds, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
304. Id. at 37.
305. Id. at 56.
306. Id. at 57. The court recognized that states have traditionally been permitted to require warnings for
hazardous products but found that this state law was broader than most in that it imposed liability on manufacturers
that do not intend to sell in the state. This distinction of the pervasive common law rule that manufacturers provide
warnings about hazardous products was especially superficial and unconvincing. Under the court's reasoning, many
states' failure to warn actions could be viewed as violating the dormant Commerce Clause. Indeed, manufacturers
have made such claims, although without notable success. Cf District of Columbia v. Baretta, U.S.A., Corp., 847
A.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding that strict liability claims against gun manufacturers did not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause).
307. 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22348 (lst Cir. Oct. 16, 2001), af'd on other grounds, 312 F.3d 24 (lst Cir.
2002).
308. Id. at *3.
309. Id. at *51-52.
310. Id. at *52-54.
311. 320 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003).
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of tobacco products.3" 2 Obviously, that provision could have prohibited the sale of
cigarettes over the Internet. It was challenged by some leading cigarette manufacturers that were interested in establishing their own websites for selling cigarettes
directly to consumers.31 3
In considering the claim that the law violated the dormant Commerce Clause,
federal district court judge Loretta Preska, the same judge who wrote the opinion in
Pataki, first asked whether the law discriminated against interstate commerce by
favoring local retailers.1 a Under the law, Internet sales were virtually eliminated,
while at the same time, sales from local retailers, also known as "brick and mortar"
vendors, were untouched. 5 Moreover, the statute had an exemption for individuals
who shipped no more than 800 cigarettes.1 6 Judge Preska found that the fact that the
statute prohibited deliveries from interstate suppliers while effectively exempting
deliveries from "brick and mortar" retailers constituted favoritism for in-state merchants, which triggered "strict scrutiny" under the dormant Commerce Clause. 1 7
Turning then to the state's rationale for the statute, Judge Preska found that the law
could not survive strict scrutiny because the state had not demonstrated that its
regulation would have a significant impact on the sale of cigarettes to minors,
because minors could get cigarettes through other means.31 ' Nor had the state
demonstrated that it could not accomplish its goals through means less disruptive to
commerce. 9 As a result, Judge Preska found the statute violated the dormant
Commerce Clause.320
The court of appeals disagreed, applying a far narrower concept of "discrimination" and hence using a less stringent form of review.3"2' In an opinion by Judge
Miner, the court of appeals initially concluded that, despite the exemption for small
retailers, the statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce in either intent
or effect.322 Then, applying the Pike balancing test, the court focused on the health
benefits that might arise from the statute.323 The court noted that although only 1.9%
of youth smokers who purchased cigarettes in 1999 obtained their cigarettes through
the mail, preventing even those young people from smoking was enough of a health
benefit to ensure that the statute survived the Pike balancing test.324 Importantly, the

312. Id. at 204, 206.
313. Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. v. Spitzer, No.00 Civ. 7274, No. 00 Civ. 7750, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis
7548, *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 8,2001), rev'dsub nom. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Spitzer, 320 F.3d 200
(2d Cir. 2003).
314. Id. at*33-35.
315. Id. at*52-53.

316. id. at *22-23.
317. id. at *5.
318. Id. at *57-58.

319. Id. at *35-36.
320. The court also found that the statute would not survive the Pike balancing test. In undertaking this test,

the court relied on the same conclusions as to the statute's public health rationale as it used when applying the
supposedly lesser analysis applicable for state laws that are in fact discriminatory. Id. at 93-97.
321. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 320 F.3d at 211-12.
322. Id. at 212-14.
323. Id. at 216-17.
324. Id. at 217. This approach is radically different from the one employed by the district court in Pataki. In
that case, the court found that the state benefit could not outweigh the burden to commerce in large measure because
the state could not in fact totally protect young people from obscenity on the Internet. 969 F. Supp. at 178-81. In
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court recognized that the state did not have to protect all young people from
cigarettes; it merely had to show that some youth were harmed by mail order or
Internet sales.325 This approach is radically different from the one employed by
Judge Preska in either Brown & Williamson or Pataki,which appeared to require a
state to show that a health statute would effectively solve the problem it sought to
address in order to survive review under the dormant Commerce Clause.32 6 Instead,
the court of appeals recognized that a state could legitimately take some steps to
protect young people from tobacco even if those steps could not be expected to
achieve a miracle by eliminating the problem entirely.327
Taken together, Phillip Morris,Inc. v. Reilly and Brown & Williamson demonstrate that the Commerce Clause need not prevent states from protecting the health
of their young people in the Internet age.3 28 These cases show that by refusing to see
a statute that adds costs to or burdens interstate commerce as constituting discrimination, and by giving respect to a state's legitimate health concerns, the
dormant Commerce Clause can in fact allow states to enact and experiment with
new approaches to tobacco control. Nevertheless, challenges to these state laws, in
addition to the decisions in ConsolidatedCigarand the decisions by Judge Preska
in Patakiand Brown & Williamson, demonstrate that state public health laws remain
quite vulnerable to the uncertain tentacles of the dormant Commerce Clause. What
states can do, and how courts should respond, is discussed in Part IV.B.
B. State Regulations of Internet Tobacco Sales and the Dormant Commerce
Clause
There can be little doubt that state regulations aimed at reducing the sale of
tobacco products to minors via the Internet implicate the dormant Commerce
Clause. As we have noted before, the Internet is an interstate and international
network. Laws that regulate it, almost by definition, affect interstate commerce and
are subject to questioning and review under the dormant Commerce Clause. That
does not mean, however, that properly tailored laws should not be able to survive
such review. Despite Judge Preska's assertions, 329 respect for interstate commerce
does not compel the forfeiture of state public health powers.
Perhaps the state tobacco control policy that is most vulnerable to the limits
imposed by the dormant Commerce Clause is state tobacco taxes. As was noted
above, taxation is one of the most effective tools for preventing young people from
becoming addicted to tobacco.33 ° When young people purchase cigarettes from a

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., in contrast, the appeals court recognized that the state did not have to protect
all young people from cigarettes. It merely had to show that some youth were harmed by mail order or Internet sales.
320 F.3d at 217.
325. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 320 F.3d at 217; see also Oltra, Inc. v. Pataki, 273 F. Supp. 2d 265
(W.D.N.Y. 2003).
326. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 320 F.3d 200; Pataki,969 F. Supp. 160.
327. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 320 F.3d at 217.
328. Since this article has been in press, a state supreme court has likewise upheld a state law aimed at
preventing out-of-state sellers, including those operating via the Internet, from selling cigarettes. See Ark. Tobacco
Control Bd. v. Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co., No. 04-273, 2004 Ark. LEXIS 765, at *25 (Ark. Dec. 9, 2004).
329. See supra text accompanying notes 261-268, 314-320.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
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local retailer, they are forced to pay a tax, which makes cigarettes far more
expensive for them. By purchasing cigarettes over the net, minors can usually avoid
the tax, making cigarettes more affordable within their limited budgets.
Under the Supreme Court's Quill decision, as discussed previously, the dormant
Commerce Clause prevents a state from taxing an out-of-state enterprise whose only
contact with the state consists of the shipment of goods to the state and minimal
" ' Moreover, Quill would appear to prohibit a state
advertising seen in the state.33
from placing a requirement on such out-of-state businesses to collect and remit the
use taxes that residents of the state are generally required to pay when they purchase
goods that are sold out-of-state and are exempt from the sales tax. 332
Quill, however, concerned a state sales tax law that was clearly designed to raise
revenue, not to protect public health. Tobacco taxes are different, as they aim to
reduce an unhealthy activity.333 The question therefore arises as to whether the
Court's analysis in Quill is appropriate for reviewing the constitutionality of a
tobacco tax that is clearly and convincingly adopted as part of a public health policy.
From almost all perspectives, such taxes are no different than police power
regulations that apply to and affect interstate commerce. As we have seen, these
regulations are also subject to strenuous, indeed, sometimes strict, review under the
dormant Commerce Clause.334 But the review applied is not identical to, and not
necessarily as fatal as, the approach mandated by Quill.33 5
Moreover, the hurdle that Quill places on state efforts to use the power to tax to
protect public health, while enormous, is not completely insurmountable. First, as
we shall discuss more in Part V, this limitation, like all of the limitations imposed
by the dormant Commerce Clause may be overcome by federal legislation. Under
settled jurisprudence, Congress has the authority to empower states to undertake
actions that would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause.336 In fact,
legislation that would address the taxation problem has been proposed in Congress. 337 Moreover, important mitigating federal legislation already exists. The
Jenkins Act, enacted in 1949, already requires out-of-state tobacco retailers to disclose to state officials the names and addresses of state residents who have purchased tobacco from them.33 While imperfect for a number of reasons, including
questions concerning the ability of states to enforce violations of the Act, 339 the
Jenkins Act nevertheless provides an important mechanism for limiting the ability
of Internet tobacco vendors to operate in a tax-free environment.'

331. 504 U.S. at 301-02.
332. Id. at 315.
333. Of course, the same could be said for other so-called "sin taxes." Tobacco taxes, however, aim at
discouraging an activity that is not only the subject of significant moral approbation, but is also the nation's number
one public health problem. As the discussion below will make clear, that fact should not be lost in the analysis.
334. See supra Part I.B.
335. For a discussion of the review applied to police power regulations of Internet tobacco sellers, see infra
Part IV.B.
336. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) (upholding Wilson Act giving states authority to regulate imported
liquor).
337. See infra text accompanying notes 367-369.
338. Pub. L No. 363, 63 Stat. 884 (1949) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 375-378 (2000)).
339. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Banthin, supra note 16, at 340-41.
340. Additional complications arise when the vendors are located on tribal lands. See Banthin, supra note 16,
at 353-54.
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No such federal statutory support exists for state police power regulations that
aim at reducing the sale of tobacco products to minors over the Internet. For these
regulations, which include those that license sellers, impose age verification requirements, and demand some type of check-back mechanism, 34' to survive judicial
review under the dormant Commerce Clause, it is particularly critical that they do
not discriminate on their face between in-state and out-of-state retailers. In order to
avoid being found per se unconstitutional, these regulations should be drafted in a
way that makes absolutely clear that dealers operating out-of-state are treated no
differently than dealers operating in state. Moreover, the type of "brick and mortar"
exemption included in the New York law and ultimately vindicated in Brown &
Williamson should probably be avoided precisely because it results in such a
significant disparate impact
as to make the statute susceptible to the type of analysis
34 2
used by Judge Preska.
In addition, to minimize the risk that courts will find the state regulation at issue
an unconstitutional projection of the state's law onto out-of-state activity, violating
the norm against extraterritoriality, states should omit any provisions in their
regulations that formally tie the application of their law to actions taken in other
states. In other words, states should avoid regulations that mimic the liquor pricing
laws at issue in Brown-FormanDistillersCorp. and Healy.343 Thus, states should not
tie the application of any age-verification requirements or licensing schemes to an
Internet site's activity in other states. Regulations that require a vendor to abide by
any licensing scheme imposed by another state, or to verify the age of all purchasers
including those not in the regulating state, should be avoided. Instead, following the
lead of cases such as People v. Foley,344 the state should be explicit that its regulatory requirements apply only to retailers (or common carriers, as Maine's regulation
does) 34' who knowingly ship products into the state. Yet, even if state health laws
are drafted with the greatest of care and with utmost regard to constitutional
scruples, the reality remains: regulations that target or apply to Internet sales,
whether by imposing licensing requirements on Internet vendors or demanding
meaningful age verification requirements, will place demands on interstate commerce and will apply to activity that occurs largely out-of-state.
The fact that such regulations place obligations on interstate enterprises, however,
should not lead courts to conclude that they discriminate against interstate commerce or that they have an impermissible extraterritorial reach. Indeed, despite the
potentially broad reach of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding discrimination
and extraterritoriality, the per se rule is best understood as applying to cases in
which there is either explicit discrimination against out-of-state interests as compared to in-state interests, or a significant reason to believe that the state law at hand
was motivated by a desire to protect or promote a local industry to the detriment of
341. See supra text accompanying notes 132-134.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 261-268, 314-320. Of course, it may be the case that such local
exemptions are sometimes politically necessary in order to ensure passage of public health legislation in a state
legislature. Public advocates need to be mindful that such political compromises may in fact be poison pills that
make the legislation or regulation far more susceptible to being struck down on constitutional grounds.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 210-218.
344. 731 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 2000).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 135-148.
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outside competitors. 6 Thus, as long as it is clear -that a state's regulation of
interstate vendors is no more onerous than its regulations of brick and mortar
vendors, which should be the case given the extensive regulations that are in place
and are applicable to such vendors,347 courts should see that health regulations that
impact interstate commerce do not impermissibly discriminate against interstate
commerce as that term is used in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.34 8
Even if courts accept this critical point and limit the reach of the per se rule to
situations in which there is a significant reason to suspect that a state has protectionist aims, state regulations of Internet sales would remain subject to the Pike
balancing test. The question then arises as to how courts will apply that test. Will
they give weight and a large degree of deference to a state's public health goals, as
they, as in some recent cases, give
the Supreme Court has counseled?349 Or, will
350
short shrift to public health considerations?
The question is a fundamental one and goes both to the heart of federalism and
the ability of states to provide for the health and safety of their populations. The
public health benefits of a new state health law are often unclear and difficult to
ascertain. Public health evidence is complex and, as the Institute of Medicine35 has
noted, the legal system often lacks the tools it needs to competently evaluate such
evidence.352 At the same time, even when new public health laws are enacted on the
basis of a solid understanding of the public health problem and with a good grounding in existing science, it will take years of study to ascertain their efficacy. The
impact of a new regulation responsive to new technology can only be studied after
it is enacted and implemented. But it is precisely when a regulation is new and
uncommon, existing in only one or two states, that it appears most burdensome on
interstate commerce. For it is precisely at this point, when the evidence of a
regulation's efficacy has yet to be demonstrated, that it places an interstate industry
in the undesirable situation of having to abide by novel and inconsistent regulations
that may require it to adopt new technologies or strategies.
The inherent difficulty of proving that a new health regulation will have a
demonstrable impact on public health explains why it is critical for courts, in the
absence of evidence of protectionism, to grant deference to state health regulations.

346. See supra Part Hu1B. Some commentators believe that the per se test should be limited to cases in which
there is protectionism. E.g., Catherine Gage O'Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate
DiscriminationUnder the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DtEGO L. REv. 571 (1997). The extraterritoriality
cases decided by the Supreme Court also involve state laws that are almost obviously designed to protect local
economic interests. See supra Part I.D. In contrast, in Walsh, where there was absolutely no reason to suspect that
the state was trying to favor an in-state industry, the Court rejected the claim that the Maine statute violated the
extraterritoriality norm. See 538 U.S. at 670.
347. See supra Part H.
348. Cf.Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that, in the absence of discriminatory intent, a
disparate impact does not constitute discrimination for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause). The lower courts,
however, have not always understood that the fact that a state law burdens interstate commerce more heavily than
instate commerce, or at all, should not suffice to conclude that it violates the Commerce Clause.
349. See supra Part II.A.

350. See supra Part II.A.
351. INST. OF MED., supra note 203, at 143.
352. See Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science" Fiction:Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of Science in
Public Health and EnvironmentalRegulation, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. Autumn 2003, at 96-97 n.149 (discussing
the inadequacies of judicial review of scientific evidence and decisions made by agencies).
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Of course, deference should not mean mindless acceptance. But when a state health
law lacking protectionist motives is enacted to address a clearly established public
health problem, such as youth smoking, and is supported by sound reasoning, a
court should not demand that the state have substantial scientific evidence in place
to demonstrate the regulation's efficacy or its cost/benefit ratio.353 Nor should a
court require the state to prove that the regulation will "solve" the problem, because
with the exception of the smallpox vaccine, which has rid the world-barring bioterrorism-of smallpox, no health intervention has ever solved a health problem
completely. Instead, courts must understand that although public health laws cannot
be expected to work miracles, they can make important, incremental changes that,
across a population, can have a major impact.
In order to grant this deference, and to give states latitude in enacting public
health regulations, courts must be willing to recognize the critical role that states
play in protecting public health in our constitutional scheme. Fidelity to the Constitution's text and history, as well as principles of federalism and concern for the
public's good, demands no less.
V. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Few can doubt that bringing to bear the resources available to federal law
enforcement officials would help address the problems raised by Internet tobacco
retailers. For example, in August 2002, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
issued a report on Internet tobacco sales in which states claimed that federal
involvement in tobacco tax collection was needed, whether the involvement was
administrative or legislative." Some states participating in the report concluded that
they lacked the legal authority to prosecute Internet tobacco retailers for tobacco tax
evasion. 35 After Quill, the states lack a sufficient nexus under the Commerce Clause
to impose the tobacco tax directly on retailers. While states may avoid Quill by

353. The argument put forth here is similar, in many respects, to arguments made in favor of the precautionary
principle. PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
(Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner eds., 1999). However, one critical distinction exists. We are not suggesting
that governments should broadly adopt a precautionary principle for all problems. We are instead suggesting that
where there is a clearly demonstrated major public health problem, such as youth smoking, courts should be
deferential to decisions of legislatures and administrative agencies and permit them to impose regulatory
requirements that may be understood as implementing a precautionary principle. Our argument, therefore, is based
more on principles of separation of powers and federalism than on principles of precaution.
354. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., INTERNET CIGARETTE SALES: GIVING ATFINVESTIGATVE AUTHORITY MAY
IMPROVE REPORTING AND ENFORCEMENT 15 (GAO-02-743 2002). For example, in the 2002 GAO report, all nine

state revenue departments that provided information for the report agreed that "their states lack the legal authority
necessary to enforce the [Jenkins] [A]ct and penalize the vendors who violate it, particularly with the vendors
residing in other states." Id. Recent state efforts, however, contradict the report. For example, the State of
Washington, which participated in the GAO Report, later successfully sued under the Jenkins Act to force
dirtcheapcig.com to comply with all aspects of the Jenkins Act, including regularly providing customer lists to
revenue officials. Wash. Dep't of Revenue v. www.dirtcheapcig.com, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1055 (W.D.
Wash. 2003); see Banthin, supra note 16, at 345. States have an implied cause of action under the Jenkins Act to

seek injunctive relief sufficient to compel compliance with the Jenkins Act. See Banthin, supra note 16, at 341-45
(2004).
355. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 354, at 15.
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collecting tobacco taxes directly from customers after the purchase, this approach
can be time consuming and expensive.356
States have also expressed concerns about collecting tobacco taxes from Internet
retailers located on tribal lands. 357 The majority of Internet cigarette retailers
operating from within the United States do so from within tribal lands,358 where they
enjoy broad immunity from state prosecution. 359 "[S]overeign immunity is immunity
from lawsuits generated in judicial systems that have no jurisdiction over tribes
because of their sovereign right to govern themselves.,, 360 Although many Native
American tribes have entered into tax-related compacts with states or have otherwise
resolved the tobacco tax concerns amicably, some states and tribes within their
borders have found it difficult to locate common ground. For these and other
reasons, federal legislation is often seen as the only solution.
Responding to the states' concerns, on December 9, 2003, the Senate
unanimously passed Senate Bill 1177, which would have amended the Jenkins Act
with the goal of improving compliance with state tobacco tax laws.36' In the House,
complementary legislation, House Resolution 2824, was introduced but not voted
upon.362 Both proposals would have required Internet tobacco vendors to pay all
state and local tobacco taxes applicable where the customer resides before shipment363 and to submit periodic reports to the revenue departments in states where
their customers receive tobacco products.3 " Additionally, states would have been
authorized to publish a list of out-of-state tobacco vendors who are not in compliance with applicable state and federal tobacco tax laws.365 Common carriers and
other like entities would have been prohibited from shipping products for these
vendors into the states where they are listed.3 66
Federal legislation was also proposed in 2003 to address youth access concerns
related to Internet cigarette vendors. 367 House Resolution 3047, which was not voted
on, would have mandated identity-verification protocols, which included obtaining
a copy of each customer's government-issued identification, his or her email
address, his or her social security number, and a signed statement attesting that the
information given is accurate and authentic. 368 House Resolution 3047 also would

356. See Banthin, supra note 16, at 351. Some states have successfully prosecuted Internet cigarette retailers
for tobacco tax evasion under the Federal Jenkins Act. See id. at 344-45; www.dirtcheap.cig.com, 260 F. Supp. at
1055.
357. See Eduardo Porter, Indian Web Sales of Taxless Tobacco Face New Pressure,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2004.
358. See Ribisl et al., Web Sites, supra note 126, at 355.
359. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizens Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 507 (1991).
360. American Indian Policy Center, Sovereign Immunity, available at http://www.airpi.orglprojects/
sovimmun.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
361. S. 1177, 108th Cong. (2003).

362. See Internet Tobacco Sales Enforcement Act, H.R. 2824, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003); see also 150 CONG.
REC. D35 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2004) (amended and passed by Committee on the Judiciary).
363. See S.1177 § 2A(d); H.R. 2824 § 2(a).
364. See S.1177 § 2(b); H.R. 2824 § 2(b).
365. See S. 1177 § 2A(e); H.R. 2824 § 2(a)(3).
366. See S.1177 § 2A(e)(2)(c); H.R. 2824 § 2(a)(3)(B)(i). Shipment may occur ifthe delivery service makes
a good faith effort to ensure that there are no tobacco products in the package to be shipped.
367. See H.R. 3047, 108th Cong. (2003).
368. See id. § 3(d).
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have required vendors to disclose information on package labeling and confirm each
order with the customer through a communication that is distinct from the one used
to place the order.369
Even if these federal legislative proposals had been enacted, they would not have
resolved the broader concerns raised by dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
In fact, the constraint placed on state health policies by broad judicial constructions
of the dormant Commerce Clause actually reduces the motivation for federal
involvement in public health policy. A justification typically offered in support of
federal legislation is the need for uniform policy on a particular issue.37 ° Congress
often legislates in response to the perception that inconsistent state policies are
especially burdensome for regulated entities.371 When judges apply the dormant
Commerce Clause too readily, they squelch the ability of states to enact such
measures, thereby dissipating the pressure on industry to accept, and Congress to
enact, a single, national solution. In essence, through the dormant Commerce
Clause, the courts (and not Congress) define how and when national uniformity on
a particular issue is appropriate.372
In addition to reducing the pressure for congressional action, overly broad
enforcement of the dormant Commerce Clause also stifles innovation in public
health policy. 373 The ability of science and research to inform public health policy
depends on having regulatory examples to study. 374 Different states' regulations
provide these examples. Only after the various state regulatory approaches are
allowed to operate does Congress have reliable examples as3 75 to which policy
approaches are fruitful and properly targeted and which are not.
Thus, although states may now welcome the proposed federal legislation pertaining to the Internet sale of tobacco, they do so, ironically, because of the
constraints placed on them by the dormant Commerce Clause. The super-geographical aspects of the Internet afford potential complainants ample opportunity to
bring dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state laws that relate in any way to
regulation of Internet-based commerce. 376 And as long as the courts give little
weight to state public health goals in reviewing such challenges, states will be forced
to seek support for their health policies from Congress.377 However, as Congress's

369. See id. § 3(g).
370. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective Control of the
Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63, 66-70 (1997).
371. See id. at 69-70.
372. Even if the dormant Commerce Clause analyses could make room for the examination of public health
research, the Court rules of evidence allow opposing parties to impose significant hurdles for the accurate evaluation
of public health issues. Lissy Friedman et al., How Tobacco Friendly Science Escapes Scrutiny in the Courtroom,
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (forthcoming) (on file with the New Mexico Law Review).
373. See supra PartllD.
374. See supra Part I.D.
375. See supra Part I1.D.
376. See Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 505 (5th Cit. 2001) (criticizing
complainant's dormant Commerce Clause argument as it "would allow corporations or individuals to circumvent
otherwise constitutional state laws and regulations simply by connecting the transaction to the internet").
377. The constraints placed on states by the Commerce Clause have also led to efforts to develop interstate
compacts, such as the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement. See Streamlined Sales Tax Project, at
www.streamlinedsalestax.org (last visited Jan. 17, 2005) (promoting a multi-state tax project to "develop measures
to design, test and implement a sales and tax system that radically simplifies sales and use taxes"). While such
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failure to enact either House Resolution 2824 or House Resolution 3047 demonstrates, the federal legislature cannot be counted upon to protect state public health
policies. The protection of public health, therefore, requires a reconsideration of the
weight given to public health policies in cases brought under the dormant Commerce
Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
The sale of tobacco products over the Internet poses a significant challenge to
state public health policies and the federal courts. In response to these sales, states
must rethink how they can protect young people from smoking and becoming
addicted to cigarettes. The federal courts, meanwhile, must consider how to honor
the Constitution's commitment to free interstate trade and open markets while
granting states the latitude they need to fulfill their traditional role of protecting
health. Neither task will be easy.
However, while the specific issues raised by the Internet are new, the fundamental challenge of protecting public health while preventing inappropriate protectionism is not. The history of public health law, indeed, the history of constitutional
law, demonstrates the ubiquity of the problem as well as the unsatisfactory nature
of simple doctrinal formulations. Nevertheless, both respect for federalism and a
regard for the health of populations suggest that courts should be more cognizant
than some have been in recent years of the issues at stake and the dangers that arise
from an overly broad and formalistic application of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. Moreover, courts must recognize that if states are to be able to respond to
a rapidly changing technological and public health environment, they must be given
substantial latitude or deference in implementing and experimenting with new
approaches to public health protection.
Most importantly, courts must become comfortable with evaluating and giving
weight to public health claims. As we have suggested above, the judiciary's discomfort with assessing state public health claims can easily turn deference into
disregard.378 This does not mean, of course, that the courts should become experts
on public health policy or epidemiology. It does mean, however, that they should
be able to give state public health claims the attention and due regard that is
routinely given to claims of commercial harm. Only by taking public health issues
seriously, and questioning them when they are implausible or pretextual, will courts
be able to recognize and validate them when they are real. And only when courts are
able to distinguish innovative public health measures from protectionism that wears
the garb of public health will they be able to apply the dormant Commerce Clause
so that it is as protective of public health as it is of commerce.

agreements may reduce the burden of some aspects of tax enforcement, they may do so by constraining unique state
policies.
378. See supra Part uI.C.

